Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE
DISTINCTIO V.
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 107-110.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD
DISTINCTION 5
Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 107-110.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

Utrum divina essentia genuerit Filium, vel genita sit a Patre, vel de ipsa natus sit Filius, vel Spiritus sanctus processerit.

Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Pater genuit[1] divinam essentiam, vel quod divina essentia genuit Filium, vel essentia genuit essentiam, an omnino non genuit nec genita est divina essentia.

Ad quod catholicis tractatoribus consentientes dicimus, quod nec Pater genuit, nec divina essentia genuit[2] essentiam. Hic autem nomine essentiae intelligimus divinam naturam, quae communis est tribus personis et tota in singulis. Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam; quia si Pater diceretur genuisse divinam essentiam, essentia divina relative diceretur ad Patrem vel pro relativo poneretur. Si autem relative diceretur vel pro relativo poneretur, non indicaret essentiam. Ut enim ait Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate:[3] « Quod relative dicitur, non indicat substantiam ».

Item, cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius rei, quae ipse est; et ita eadem res se ipsam

Chapter I

Whether the Divine Essence begot the Son, and/or has been begotten by the Father, and/or (whether) the Son has been born from It, and/or the Holy Spirit has proceeded (from It).

After this there is asked, whether it must be conceded, that the Father begot[1] the Divine Essence, and/or that the Divine Essence begot the Son, and/or the Essence begot the Essence, or whether the Divine Essence entirely did not beget nor has been begotten.

To which consenting with catholic authors [tractatoribus] we say, that neither did the Father beget, nor did the Divine Essence beget the[2] Essence. Moreover here by the name of essence we understand the Divine Nature, which is common to the Three Persons and is whole in each of them [in singulis]. For that reason there must not be said, that the Father begot the Divine Essence; because if the Father were said to have begotten the Divine Essence, the Divine Essence would be said in a manner relative to [relative ad] the Father and/or would be put in place of a relative. Moreover if it would be said in a manner relative (to) and/or (if) it would be put in place of a relative, it would not indicate the Essence. For as (St.) Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity:[3] « What is said in a relative manner, does not indicate a substance ».

Likewise, since God the Father is the Divine Essence, if He was Its begetter, He would certainly [utique] be the begetter of that

genuisset, quod Augustinus negat, ut supra[4] ostendimus.

Thing, which He is; and thus the same Thing would have begotten Its very self, which (St.) Augustine denies, as we have shown above.[4]

Item, si Pater est genitor essentiae divinae, cum ipse essentia divina sit et Deus sit, eo ergo[5] quod generat, et est et Deus est. Ita ergo non illud quod generatur, est a Patre Deus, sed Pater eo quod generat, et est et Deus est. Et si ita est, non genito gignens, sed gignenti genitus[6] causa est, ut et sit et Deus sit. Simili ratione probat Augustinus in libro septimo de Trinitate,[7] « quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia, quam genuit, quia si ea sapiens est, ea est; hoc enim est ibi esse quod sapere. Quodsi hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam, quam genuit, sapiens Pater est. Quid enim aliud dicimus, cum dicimus: hoc illi est esse quod sapere, nisi, eo est quo sapiens est? Ergo quae causa illi est, ut sapiens sit, etiam ipsa illi causa est, ut sit. Si ergo sapientia, quam genuit, illi causa est, ut sapiens sit, et causa illi est, ut sit. Sed causam Patri, qua sit, a Patre genitam, nullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam; quid enim est insanius? Ita ergo, si Pater genuit essentiam, qua est, essentia, quam genuit, causa est illi, ut sit ». Non ergo ipsam, qua[8] est, essentiam genuit. « Nam in illa simplicitate, inquit Augustinus,[9] quia non est aliud sapere quam esse, eadem est ibi sapientia quae essentia »; ideoque quod de sapientia, hoc de essentia dicimus. Sicut ergo non genuit sapientiam, qua sapiens est, ita nec essentiam, qua est. Ut enim sapientia sapiens est et potentia potens, ita et essentia ipse est, eademque est sapientia et potentia, quae essentia. Patet itaque ex praedictis, quia[10] Pater essentiam divinam non genuit.

Likewise, if the Father is the begetter of the Divine Essence, since He by the Divine Essence is and is God, therefore[5] by that which He generates, He both is and is God. Thus, therefore, not that which is generated, is God by [a] the Father, but the Father by that which He generates, both is and is God. And if He is thus, the one begetting (is) not (the cause) for the begotten, but rather the begotten[6] is the cause for the one begetting, to both be and be God. By a similar reason (St.) Augustine proves (this) in the seventh book <u>On the Trinity</u>,[7] « that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom, which He has begotten, because if He is wise by That, He is by That; for There there is a "to be" for the reason that there is a "to know" [eo . . . quod sapere]. Whereas if There there is a "to be" for the reason that there is a "to know", (then) not through that Wisdom, which He has begotten, is the Father wise. For what other do we say, when we say: in That [illi] there is a "to be" for the reason that there is a "to know", except, He is by that by which He is wise? Therefore the cause which is for That [illi], to be wise, is also the cause itself for That, to be. If, therefore, the Wisdom, which He has begotten, is the cause for That, to be wise, It is also the cause of That, to be. But in no manner has anyone said that the cause for the Father, by which He is, (is) the Wisdom begotten by the Father; for what is more insane? Thus, therefore, if the Father has begotten the Essence, by which He is, the Essence, which He has begotten, is the cause of That, to be ». Therefore He did not beget the Essence itself, by which[8] He is. « For in that Simplicity », says (St.) Augustine,[9] « because "to know" is not other than "to be", There Wisdom is the same which Essence (is) »; and for that reason what is of [de] Wisdom, this we say of the Essence. Therefore just as He did not beget the Wisdom, by which He is wise, so neither the Essence, by which He is. For just as Wisdom is wise and the Power powerful [potentia potens], so also the Essence itself, and Wisdom and the Power is the same which Essence (is). And so it is clear from

the aforesaid, that[10] the Father did not beget the Divine Essence.

Huic autem videtur contrarium quod Augustinus ait in libro unico de Fide et symbolo, capitulo tertio:[11] « Deus, cum Verbum genuit, id quod ipse est genuit, nec de nihilo nec de aliqua iam facta conditaque materia, sed de se ipso id quod est ipse ». Item:[12] « Deus Pater, qui verissime se indicare animis cognituris et voluit et potuit, hoc ad se ipsum indicandum genuit, quod est ipse qui genuit ». Ecce aperte dicit his verbis, Deum Patrem genuisse illud quod ipse est. Illud autem quod ipse est, non est nisi essentia divina: videtur ergo divinam essentiam genuisse. Ad quod respondemus, illa verba sic intelligenda esse dicentes: Pater de se ipso genuit illud quod ipse est, id est Filium, qui est illud quod Pater est. Nam *quod* Pater est, et Filius hoc est, sed non *qui* Pater est, et Filius hic est.

But to this there seems contrary what (St.) Augustine says in his one book On the Faith and the Creed, in the third chapter:[11] « God, when He begot the Word, begot That which He is, neither from nothing nor from any already made or founded matter, but from His very self That which He is ». Likewise:[12] « God the Father, who has willed and has been able to indicate Himself in a most true manner to the souls (who) are to know (Him), to indicate His very self begot This, which He who begot is ». Behold he openly says by these words, that God the Father has begotten That which He is. But that which He is, is naught but the Divine Essence: therefore it seems that He did beget the Divine Essence. To which we respond, saying that those words are to be thus understood: The Father from His very self begot That which He is, that is the Son, who is That which the Father is. For *what* the Father is, the Son is also this (Thing), but *who* the Father is, the Son is not also this (One).

Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium, quia cum Filius sit divina essentia, iam esset Filius res, a qua generatur: et ita eadem res se ipsam generaret. Ita etiam dicimus, quod essentia divina non genuit essentiam. Cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia essentiam genuit, eadem res se ipsam genuit, quod omnino esse non potest; sed Pater solus genuit Filum, et a Patre et Filio procedit Spiritus sanctus.[13]

Thus there also must not be said, that the Divine Essence begot the Son, because since the Son is the Divine Essence, the Son would already be the thing, by which He is generated: and thus the same thing would generate its very self. Thus we also say, that the Divine Essence did not beget the Essence. For since a one and a most high, certain thing is the Divine Essence, if the Divine Essence has begotten the Essence, the same thing has begotten its very self, which entirely cannot be; but rather the Father alone has begotten the Son, and from the Father and the Son the Holy Spirit proceeds.[13]

Praedictis autem videtur contrarium esse quod dicit Augustinus in libro septimo de Trinitate:[14] « Hoc, inquit, est Deo esse quod sapere; unde Pater et Filius simul sunt sapientia, quia una essentia: et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia ». Ecce his verbis aperte dicit Augustinus, sapientiam de sapientia et essentiam de essentia, ubi videtur significare, quod sapientia sapientiam et essentia es- / -sentiam genuerit.

But to the aforesaid there seems contrary what (St.) Augustine says in the seventh book On the Trinity:[14] « For this reason », he says, « it belongs to God to be because (it belongs to Him) to know; whence the Father and the Son are simultaneously Wisdom, because (They are) one Essence ». Behold by these words (St.) Augustine openly says, that Wisdom (is) from Wisdom and Essence from Essence, where it seems that he signifies, that Wisdom has begotten Wisdom and Essence Es- /- sence.

[1] Solus cod. A ter habet *genuerit* pro *genuit*.
[2] Vat. et edd. 4, 9 superflue addunt *divinam*.
[3] Cap. 7. n. 8, ubi: *Quod autem relative pronuntiatur* etc. Paulo supra edd. 1, 8 post *indicaret* addunt *divinam*.
[4] Dist. IV. c. 1.
[5] Vat. et ed. 4 non bene omittunt *ergo*; paulo ante codd. A B C E et ed. 1 addendo *et* legunt: *essentia divina et sit et Deus sit*; cod. vero D *etiam* pro *et*.
[6] Cod. D et edd. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 minus bene *genitum*; in principio huius propositionis cod. C *Quodsi* pro *Et si*.
[7] Cap. 1. n. 2; in quo textu Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 bis pro *ibi* legit *sibi*; ed. 5 bis *illi*; codd. bis *ibi*, exceptis D E, qui primo loco habet *ei*; ed. Augustini modo *ibi*, modo *illi*.
[8] Sola Vat. perperam *quae*.
[9] Loc. cit. — Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 9 addunt *ut* ante *inquit*.
[10] Cod. D cum edd. 1, 8 elegantius *quod*.
[11] Num. 4. — Omnes codd. et edd. exceptis Vat. et edd. 4, 9, falso sic: *in libro de Fide ad Petram*.
[12] Loc. cit., in quo textu codd. B D E *se* pro *se ipsum*; post *indicandum genuit* ed. 8 adiicit *id est*; edd. 1, 3 omittunt *quod est ipse, qui genuit*.
[13] Haec doctrina Magistri oppugnata est ab abbate Ioachim, sed approbata a Concilio Lateranensi IV; cfr. infra Bonav. ad hanc dist. a. 1. a. 1. et dub. 4.
[14] Ex. cap. 1. n. 2. et c. 2. n. 3. passim excerptum. — Vat. omittit *in libro septimo de Trinitate*.

[1] Only codex A has three times the subjunctive *has begotten* [genuerit] in place of the indicative *has begotten* [genuit].
[2] The Vatican text and editions 4 and 9 superfluously adds *Divine* [divinam].
[3] Chapter 7, n. 8, where it has: *What, moreover, is pronounced in a relative manner* etc.. A little above this editions 1, and 8 after *would not indicate the* add *Divine*.
[4] Distinction IV, ch. 1.
[5] The Vatican text and edition 4 omit *therefore* [ergo] not so well; a little before this codices A B C E and edition 1 by adding *both* [et] read: *by the Divine Essence both is and is God*; but codex D has *also* in place of this *both* [et].
[6] Codex D and edition 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 have less well *the (thing) begotten* [genitum]; at the beginning of this proposition codex C has *Whereas if* in place of *And if*.
[7] Chapter 1, n. 2; in which text the Vatican text and editions 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9 twice reads *His* [sibi] in place of *There* [ibi]; edition 5 twice has *in That* [illi]; the codices twice have *There* [ibi], except for D and E, which have in the first position *Its* [ei]; the edition of (St.) Augustine has sometimes *There* [ibi], sometimes *in That* [illi].
[8] Only the Vatican has the faulty *which* [quae].
[9] Loc. cit.. — The Vatican text and editions 4, 5, 6, and 9 add *as* before *(St.) Augustine says*.
[10] Codex D together with editions 1 and 8 has the more elegant *that* [quod].
[11] Number 4. — All the codices and editions, except the Vatican text and editions 4 and 9, read falsely in this manner: in the book On the Faith to Peter.
[12] Loc. cit., in which text codices B D and E has *Himself* [se] in place of *His very self* [se ipsum]; after *begot This*, edition 8 adds *that is,* [id est]; editions 1 and 3 omit *which He who begot is*.
[13] This doctrine of Master (Peter) was opposed by Abbot Joachim (of Fiore), but approved by the Fourth Lateran Council; cf. below (what St.) Bonaventure (says) in regard to this distinction in a. 1, q. 1 and doubt 4.
[14] From chapter 1, n. 2, and ch. 2, n. 3, excerpted passim. — The Vatican text omits *in the seventh book On the Trinity*.

---

p. 108

es- / -sentiam genuerit. Idem in libro de Fide ad Petrum[1] ait: « Sic Christum Dei Filium, id est unam ex Trinitate personam, Deum verum crede, ut divinitatem eius de natura Patris natam esse non dubites ». Hic videtur dicere, quod natura Filii sit nata de natura Patris. Idem etiam in libro decimo quinto de Trinitate[2] ait: « Dicitur Filius consilium de consilio et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de

Es- / -sence. He says the same in the book On the Faith to Peter:[1] « So believe Christ the Son of God (to be) the true God, that is that (He is) A [unam] Person of the Trinity, that you may not doubt His Divinity to have been born from the Nature of the Father ». Here he seems to say, that the Nature of the son has been born from the Nature of the Father. He also says the same in the fifteenth book On the Trinity:[2] « The Son is

sapientia ». Et hic videtur dicere, quod substantia sit genita de substanti et sapientia de sapientia. Sed hoc[3] ita determinanamus: « sapientia de sapientia, et substantia de substantia est », id est Filius, qui est sapientia, qui est substantia, est de Patre, qui est eadem substantia et sapientia; et Filius, qui est divinitas, natus est de Patre, qui est natura divina. Et ut expressius dicamus, dicimus, Filium sapientiam esse de Patre sapientia, et dicimus, Filium substantiam esse genitum de Patre et a Patre substantia. Quod autem ita intelligi debeat Augustinus, ostendit in libro septimo de Trinitate[4] dicens: « Pater ipse sapientia est; et dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, quomodo dicitur lumen Patris, id est, sicut lumen de lumine et uterque unum lumen, sic intelligatur sapientia de sapientia; et uterque una sapientia et una essentia ». Item:[5] « Ideo Christus dicitur virtus et spaientia Dei, quia de Patre, virute et sapientia, etiam ipse virtus et sapientia est, sicut ipse lumen de Patre lumine est, et ipse fons vitae est apud Deum Patrem, fontem vitae. Filius ergo sapientia de Patre sapientia est, sicut Filius lumen de Patre lumine, et Deus Filius de Deo Patre, ut et singulus sit lumen et singulis Deus et singulus sapientia, et simul unum lumen, unus Deus, una sapientia ». Ecce his verbis manifeste aperit Augustinus, ex quo sensu accipienda sint praedicta verba et his similia, scilicet cum dicitur: substantia de substantia, vel substantia genuit substantiam.

said (to be) Counsel from Counsel and Will from Will, just as (He is) Substance from Substance, Wisdom from Wisdom ». And here he seems to say, that Substance has been begotten from Substance and Wisdom from Wisdom. But we determine this (text)[3] thus: « He is Wisdom from Wisdom, and Substance from Substance », that is the Son, who is the Wisdom, who is the Substance, is from the Father, who is the Divine Nature. And that we may speak more expressly, we say, that the Son (as) Wisdom is from the Father (as) Wisdom, and we say, that the Son (as) Substance has been begotten from the Father and by the Father (as) Substance. Moreover that (St.) Augustine ought thus to be understood, he shows in the seventh book On the Trinity[4] saying: « The Father Himself is Wisdom; and the Son is said (to be) the Wisdom of the Father, in that manner He is said (to be) the Light of the Father, that is, just as Light (is) from Light and each of the two [uterque] the one Light, so He is understood (to be) Wisdom from Wisdom; and each of the two the one Wisdom and the one Essence ». Likewise:[5] « For that reason Christ is said (to be) the Virtue and Wisdom of God, because from the Father, the Virtue and Wisdom, He Himself is also the Virtue and Wisdom, just as He Himself is the Light from the Father, the Light, and He Himself is the Fount of Life with [apud] God the Father, the Fount of Life. The Son, therefore, is the Wisdom from the Father, the Wisdom, just as the Son (is) the Light from the Father, the Light, and the Son of God (is) from God the Father, as each One [singulus] is both the Light and each One the God and each One the Wisdom, and simultaneously the one Light, the one God, the one Wisdom ». Behold by these words (St.) Augustine manifestly uncovers [aperit], in [ex] what sense there are to be accepted the aforesaid words and those similar, that is when there is said: Substance from Substance, and/or the Substance begot the Substance.

Huic vero etiam id contrarium videtur, quod Hilarius ait in quarto libro de Trinitate:[6] « Nihil, in quit, nisi natum habet Filius; et geniti honoris admiratio in honore generantis est ». cum ergo Filius essentiam

However to this there also seem contrary that, which (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) says in the fourth book On the Trinity:[6] « Nothing », he says, « except the Son has been born; and admiration for the honor of the one

habeat — tota enim in eo est divina essentia — videtur quod ipsa divina essentia nata sit. Item in quinto libro[7] ait: « Nativitas Dei non potest eam ex qua profecta est non tenere naturam, nec enim aliud quam Deus subsistet, quod non aliunde quam de Deo subsistit ». Ecce hic dicit nativitatem Dei profectam ex natura, et ita videtur ex his verbis atque praedictis natura Dei et genita et genuisse. Quod apertius dicit in libro non de Trinitate:[8] « Nos, inquit, unigentium Deum, in forma Dei manentem, in natura hominis mansisse profitemur, nec unitatem formae servilis in naturam divinae unitatis refundimus, nec rursus corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo eiusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem habuisse naturam, quae in forma naturae se gignentis manens, formam naturae et infirmitatis corporalis accepit. Non enim defecerat Dei natura, ne esset; sed in se humilitatem terrenae nativiatis manens sibi Dei natura susceperat, generis sui potestatem in habitu assumtae humilitatis exercens ». Ecce hic aperte dicit, et naturam genuisse, et naturam genitam, et naturam assumsisse naturam; quod a plerisque negatur. Item in eodem:[9] « Nunquid unigenito Deo contumelia est, Patrem sibi innascibilem Deum esse, cum ex innascibili Deo nativitas unigenita in naturam unigenitam subsistat »? Ecce et hic dicit unigenitam naturam.

Begotten belongs in honor to the one Generating ». Since, therefore, the Son has the Essence — for the whole Divine Essence is in Him — it seems that Divine Essence Itself has been born. Likewise in the fifth book[7] he says: « The nativity of God cannot not hold [tenere] that Nature from which it has arisen [profecta est], for no other [non aliud] than God subsists, because in no other way [non aliunde] than from God does it subsist ». Behold here he says that the nativity of God (has) arisen from the Nature, and thus it seems from these words and also from the aforesaid that the Nature of God has both begotten and been begotten. Which he says more openly in the ninth book <u>On the Trinity</u>:[8] « We », he says, « profess that the Only-Begotten God, remaining [manentem] in the form of God, remained in the form of man, nor do we pour back [refundimus] the unity of the servile form into the nature of the Divine Unity, nor again do we preach that the Father (is) in the Son by a corporal insinuation, but rather from this [ex eo] that in begetting Itself the Nature has begotten naturally a Nature of the same genus, which remaining in the form of the Nature Begetting It, has accepted a form of nature and of corporal infirmity. For the Nature of God had not failed to be; but rather remaining in Itself the Nature of God, It had undertaken [susceperat] for Itself the humility of an earthly [terrenae] nativity, exercising the power of Its own genus [generis sui] in the habit of the assumed humility ». Behold here he openly says, both that the Nature has begotten, and the Nature (has been) begotten, and that the Nature has assumed a nature; which by very many is denied. Likewise in the same (book he says):[9] « Is it contumely to the Only-Begotten God, that His own Father is the unable-to-be-born God [innascibilem Deum], since from the unable-to-be-born God there subsists an unbegotten nativity for [in] the Unbegotten Nature »? Behold here he also says (that there is) an Unbegotten Nature.

Sed quia haec verba sane vult intelligi, ipse idem dicit in quarto libro:[10] « Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi,

But because he wants these words to be sanely understood, he himself says the same in the fourth book:[10] « The

quia non sermoni res, sed rei est sermo subiectus ». Haec ergo verba ita intelligi possunt: nihil habet Filius nisi natum, id est, nihil habet secundum quod Deus est, nisi quod nascendo accepit, et ipse nascendo Patris in se subsistentem habuit naturam. Unde idem Hilarius addit in quinto libro:[11] « Eandem naturam habet genitus, quam ille qui genuit, ita tamen, ut natus non sit ille qui genuit (nam quomodo erit Pater ipse, cum genitus sit?), sed in his ipsis subsistat ille qui genitus est, in quibus totus est ipse qui genuit; quia non est aliunde qui genitus est. Et ideo non refertur ad aliud quod in uno subsistit ex uno. Ac sic in generatione Filii et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus indemutabilem gignens Deum, nec naturam suam deserit ex indemutabili Deo indemutabilis Dei perfecta nativitas. Subsistentem ergo in eo Dei naturam intelligamus, cum in Deo Deus insit; nec praeter eum qui Deus est, quisquam Deus alius sit, quia ipse Deus, / et in eo Deus ».

understanding of the things said is to be assumed from the causes for speaking [ex causis dicendi], because a thing is not subjected to discourse [sermoni], but discourse to a thing ». Therefore these words can be thus understood: nothing has the Son except that He has been born [nisi natum], that is, He has nothing according to which He is God, except what by being born He has accepted, and He Himself by being born had the Nature of the Father subsisting in Himself. Whence (St.) Hilary adds the same in the fifth book:[11] « The Begotten has the same Nature, which He who begot (has), however thus, that the One Born is not He who begot (for in what manner shall He be the Father Himself, since He has been begotten?), but among These Themselves there subsists He who has been begotten, among which the Whole is He who has begot; because in no other way [non aliunde] is He who has been begotten. And for that reason there is not referred to an other what in One subsists out of One. And so in the generation of the Son even His own Nature, as thus I call (it), does the unalterable [indemutabilis] God begetting the unalterable God follow [sequitur], nor His own nature does the perfect nativity of the unalterable God out of the unalterable God forsake [deserit]. Therefore let us understand that the Nature of God (is) subsisting in Him, since God is in God [in Deo Deus insit]; nor is there besides Him who is God, any other God, because He Himself (is) God, / and God (is) in Him ».

---

[1] Cap. 2. n. 15.
[2] Cap. 19. n. 37. — Immediate ante Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 8, omittit *etiam*.
[3] Omnes codd. contra edd. bene *haec*.
[4] Cap. 1. n. 2; ubi post *sapientia de sapientia* edd. 1, 8 addunt *et essentia de essentia*.
[5] Cap. 3. n. 4. — Circa finem huius textus codd. bis adendo *sit* legunt: *singulus sit Deus et singulus sit sap.*, quibus secundo loco accedunt edd. 1, 5, 6, 8. Pro *singulis* et *simul* edd. 2, 3, 7 quater legut male *singulis*; in fine edd. 1, 8 addunt *et* post *unus Deus*.
[6] Num. 20.
[7] Num. 37, in quo textu et paulo post Vat. et edd. 4, 7, 9 bis legunt *porvecta* pro *profecta*, sed mendose.
[8] Num. 51, in quo textu codd. A B C et edd. 5, 9 legunt: in forma *servi* manentem in natura *Dei* mansisse. Editores Maurini vero habent: in forma *Dei* manentem in natura *Dei* mansisse. Iidem lectionem nostram, quam praeter codd. D E et ceteras Magistri

---

[1] Chapter 2, n. 15.
[2] Chapter 19, n. 37. — Immediately before this the Vatican text together with the other codices, except 1 and 8, omits *also* [etiam].
[3] All the codices, contrary to the editions, have the just as good *these (words)* [quae].
[4] Chapter 1, n. 2; where after *Wisdom from Wisdom* editions 1 and 8 add *and Essence from Essence*.
[5] Chapter 3, n. 4. — Near the end of this text the codices twice by adding *is* [sit] read *each is the God and each is the Wisdom*, to which in the second place there accedes editions 1, 5, 6, and 8. In place of *each* [singulus] and *simultaneously* [simul] editions 2, 3 and 7 four times read badly *each of them* [singulis]; at the end (of the passage) editions 1 and 8 add *and* [et] after *the one God*.
[6] Number 10.
[7] Number 37, in which text and a little after this the Vatican text and editions 4, 7 and 9, twice read

edd. etiam antiquae Hilarii edd. exhibent, depravatam esse censent, cum Hilarius *formae* nomine aliud a *natura* ipsa intellexerit, scil. habitum, quem prae se tulit Christus. Iuxta ipsos sensus est, Christum secundum formam Dei semper mansisse in natura, unitate et gloria Dei, etsi secundum formam servi non statim ab ipsa hominis assumtione naturae divinae assecutus sit gloriam, sed tantum per resurrectionem. Cfr. ibid. n. 38. Licet textus Maurinorum multo probabilior esse videatur, ipsum tamen contra codd. et edd. Magistro non obtrudendum esse censuimus. — In eodem textu cum Hilario codd. A C *acceperit* pro *accepit* et in fine pro *humilitatis* Vat. et plures edd. *humanitatis*.

[9] Loc. cit. n. 53.

[10] Num. 14; cod. A et ed. 4 addunt *de Trinitate*.

[11] Num. 37, sed multis a Magistro mutatis et omissis. — Vat. et ed. 4 omittunt *idem* ante *Hilarius*. In ipsa auctoritate a codd., et ed. 1 et textu Hilarii omittitur *Pater* post *quomodo erit*. Mox contra originale, codd. A B C E et ed. 1 Vat. cum ceteris edd., mutata constructione et reiectis signis parentheseos, legit *subsistit* pro *subsistat*. Denique eadem Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 9 addendo *et* habent *subsistit et ex uno*.

advanced [provecta] in place of *arisen* [profecta], but faultily.

[8] Number 51, in which text codices A B C and editions 5 and 9 read: remaining in the form of a *slave*, remained in the nature of *God*. However the Maurini Editors have: remaining in the form of *God*, remained in the nature of *God*. These (scholars) consider our reading, which besides codices D E and the rest of the editions of Master (Peter), even the ancient editions of (St.) Hilary, exhibit, distorted, since (St.) Hilary by the noun of *form* understood something other than *nature* itself, namely the "habit", which Christ bore before Him. According to them the sense is, that Christ according to the form of God always remained in the nature, unity and glory of God, even if according to the form of a slave from the assumption itself of man He did not immediately arrive at [assecutus est] the glory of the Divine Nature, but only through (His) resurrection. Cf. ibid., n. 38. Though the text of the Maurinists seems to be more probable, we however do judge that that which is contrary to the codices and editions of Master (Peter) is not to be accepted [obtrudendum]. — In the same text together with (St.) Hilary codices A and C have the subjunctive *accepted* [acceperit] in place of the indicative *accepted* [accepit] and at the end in place of *humility* [humilitatis] the Vatican text and very many editions have *humanity* [humanitatis].

[9] Loc. cit., n. 53.

[10] Number 14; codex A and edition 4 add *On the Trinity*.

[11] Number 37, but with many things changed and omitted by Master (Peter). — The Vatican text and edition 4 omit *the same* [idem] after *add*. In the quote itself there is omitted by the codices, edition 1 and the text of (St.) Hilary, *the Father* after *in what manner shall He be* [quomodo erit]. Then contrary to the original, to codices A B C E and to edition 1, the Vatican text together with the rest of the editions, having changed the construction and rejected the parentheses, reads the indicative *subsists* [subsistit] in place of the indicative *subsists* [subsistat]. Then in the same (quote) the Vatican text and editions 4, 5, 6 and 9, by adding *et* has (the ambiguous) *in uno subsistit et ex uno* [Trans. note: *in One subsists also out of One* or *subsists in One and out of One*].

---

et in eo Deus ». Naturae ergo Dei Patris veritas in Deo Filio esse docetur, cum in eo Deus intelligatur[1] esse, qui Deus est. Est enim unus in uno et unus ab uno.

and God (is) in Him ». Therefore the truth of the Nature of God the Father is taught to be in God the Son, since "the God in Him" is understood[1] to be, "He who is God". For One is in One and One (is) by One.

Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura sacra legitur, Patrem de sua substantia genuisse Filium. Unde Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum[2] ait: « Pater Deus, de nullo

It is also said and frequently in Sacred Scripture it is read, that the Father from His own Substance has begotten the Son. Whence (St.) Augustine in the book On the

genitus Deo, semel de sua natura sine initio genuit Filium Deum sibi aequalem et eadem qua ipse naturaliter aeternus est divinitate coaeternum ». Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, Filium genitum de natura Patris. Est autem una natura Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Si ergo de natura Patris genitus est Filius, genitus est de natura Filii et Spiritus sancti, immo de natura trium peronsarum. Idem quoque Augustinus in libro decimo quinto de Trinitate[3] dicit, Christum esse Filium substantiae Patris et de substantia Patris genitum, tractans illud verbum Apostoli loquentis de Deo Patre sic: *Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae*. « Quod dictum est, inquit, *Filii caritatis suae*, nihil aliud intelligatur[4] quam Filii sui dilecti, quam Filli substantiae suae. Caritas quippe Patris, quae in natura eius est ineffabiliter simplici, nihil est aliud quam ipsa natura atque substantia, ut saepae diximus et saepe iterare non piget, ac per hoc Filius caritatis eius nullus est alius, quam qui de substantia eius est genitus ». Ecce aperte hic dicit Augustinus in libro secundo contra Maximinum haereticum,[5] substantiam Dei genuisse Filiu, et Filium genitum de substantia Patris asserit dicens: « Carnalibus cogitationibus pleni, substantiam Dei de se ipsa gignere Filium non putatis, nisi hoc patiatur, quod substantia carnis patitur, quando gignit. *Erratis nescientes Scripturas neque virtutem Dei*.[6] Nullo enim modo verum Dei Filium cogitatis, si eum natum esse de substantia Patris negatis. Non enim iam erat hominis Filius et Deo donante factus est Dei Filius, ex Deo natus gratia, non natura. An forte, etsi non homninis filius erat, tamen aliqua iam erat qualiscumque creatura et in Dei Filium, affirmastis,[7] non vos dicere de nihilo esse Dei Filium. De aliqua ergo substantia est; et si non de substantia Patris, de qua sit, dicite; sed non invenietis. Iam igitur unigenitum Dei Filium, Iesum Christum, de Patris esse substantia, no vos nobiscum pigeat confiteri ». Idem in eodem:[8] « Utrique legimus, *ut simus in vero Filio eius*, Iesus Christo. Dicite ergo nobis, utrum iste verus Dei Filius ab eis qui gratia filii sunt, quadam proprietate discretus de mulla substantia sit, an de aliqua? Non dico, in quis, de nulla,

Faith to Peter[2] says: « God the Father, begotten from no God, from His own Nature without a beginning [initio], did once begot God the Son equal and coeternal to Himself by the same Divinity by which He Himself is naturally eternal ». Behold here (St.) Augustine says, that the Son (has been) begotten from the Nature of the Father. Moreover there is one Nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. If, therefore, He has been begotten from the Nature of the Father, He has been begotten from the Nature of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, nay rather from the Nature of the Three Persons. Likewise (St.) Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity also says, that Christ is the Son of the Substance of the Father and (has) been begotten from the Substance of the Father, thus treating that word of the Apostle speaking of God the Father: *Who has snatched us from the power of darkness and has transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of His charity*. « Because there has been said », he says, « of the Son of His Charity, let nothing other be understood[4] than "of His Beloved Son", than "of the Son of His Substance". Indeed [quippe] the Charity of the Father, which is in an ineffable manner in His simple Nature, is nothing other than the Nature Itself and [atque] the Substance, as we have often said and it is not an annoyance [piget] to reiterate it [iterare], and by this [per hoc] the Son of His Charity is no one other, than He who has been begotten from His Substance ». Behold here (St.) Augustine openly says, that the Son has been begotten from the Substance of the Father and that the Son (is) of the Substance of the Father. (St.) Augustine also says the same in the second book Against Maximinus the Heretic,[5] that the Substance of God has begotten the Son, and he asserts that the Son (has been) begotten from the Substance of the Father saying: « Full of carnal thoughts, you do not think that the Substance of God begets the Son from Its very self, unless by this It suffers, what a substance of flesh suffers, when it begets. *You err not knowing the Scriptures nor the Virtue of God*.[6] For in no manner do you think (that there is) a true Son of God, if you deny that He has been born from the

nec dicam de nihilo: ergo de aliqua substantia est. Quaero, de qua? Si non de Patris substantia est, aliam quaere. Si aliam non invenis, Patris agnosce substantiam, et Filium eum Patre homoousion confitere ». Item in eodem:[9] « Confiteor, Deum Patrem omnino incorruptibiliter genuisse, sed quod est ipse genuisse. Item dico quod saepae dicendum est: aut de aliqua substantia natus est Dei Filius, aut de nulla; si de nulla: ergo de nihilo; quod vos iam non dicitis; si vero de aliqua, nec tamen de Patris substantia, non est verus Filius; si vero de Patris substantia, unius eiusdemque substantiae sunt Pater et Filius. Vos autem nec Filium[10] de substantia Patris genitum vultis; et tamen eum nec ex nihilo nec ex aliqua materia, sed ex Patre esse conceditis; nec videtis, quam necesse sit, ut qui non est ex nihilo nec ex aliqua alia re, sed ex Deo, nisi ex Dei substantia esse non possit, et hoc esse quod Deus est, de quo est, id est Deus de Deo naturs; quia non alius prius fuit, sed natura coaeterna de Deo est ».

Substance of the Father. For there was not already a Son of man and by God granting He became Son of God, born out of God by grace, not by nature. Or, even if there was not a son of man, nevertheless [tamen] was there by chance some whatever-kind-of creature and, with God changing (it), it was converted into the Son of God? But neither of these exists [nihilo horum est]: therefore either from nothing, or from some substance has He been born. But lest we would believe, that you think that the Son of God is from nothing, you have affirmed,[7] that you do not say that the Son of God is from nothing. Therefore He is from some substance; and if not from the Substance of the Father, say, which He is from; but you shall not find (one). Therefore it is already an annoyance that you do not confess with us that the Only-Begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, is from the Substance of the Father ». Likewise in the same (chapter):[8] « We both read, *that we may be in His true Son*, Jesus Christ. Therefore tell us, whether that true Son of God, different [discretus] in a certain property from those who are sons by grace, is from no substance, or whether (He is) from some (substance)? I do not say, you say, from no (substance), nor do I say from nothing: therefore He is from some substance. I ask, from which? If He is not from the Substance of the Father, I seek an other. If you do not find an other, acknowledge the Substance of the Father, and confess that the Son is consubstantial [homoousion] with the Father ». Likewise in the same (chapter):[9] « I confess, that God the Father in an entirely incorruptible manner has begotten, but that He has begotten what He Himself is. Likewise I say that there must be often said: the Son of God either has been born from some substance, or from none; if from none: therefore from nothing; which you do not now [iam] say; however if (He is) from some (substance), and not, however, from the Substance of the Father, He is not the true Son; however if from the Substance of the Father, of one and the same Substance are the Father and the Son. Moreover neither do you want a Son[10] begotten from the Substance of the Father; and nevertheless [tamen] you concede that He is neither out

of nothing nor out of some matter, but rather out of the Father; nor do you see, how necessary it is, that He who is not out of nothing nor out of some other thing, but out of God, cannot be except from the Substance of the Father, and that This is what God is, from What He is, that is God born from God; because there was no Other prior, but He is the coeternal Nature from God ».

His verbis praemissis innui videtur, quod divina substantia[11] Filium genuerit, et quod Filius sit genitus de substantia Patris, et quod de Deo est natura coaeterna, et quod Pater id quod ipse est genuit. Id autem quod ipse est, essentia divina est; et ita putari potest, divinam essentiam genuisse. Vehementer movent nos haec verba, quae quomodo intelligenda sint, mallem ab aliis audire quam tradere.[12] Ut tamen sine praeiudicio atque temeritate loquar, ex hoc sensu dicta possunt accipi: natura coaeterna de Deo est, id est, Filius coaeternus Patri de Patre est, it quod est eadem cum eo natura vel eiusdem naturae. Quem sensum confirmat Augustinus, ibidem[12] subiiciens et quod dixerat quasi explanans. Dicto enim: « Natura coaeterna de Deo est », addidit: « Non est aliud Filius quam illud de quo est, id est, unius eiusdemque substantiae est ». Deinde apertius talem intellectum ex praedictis verbis fore habendum aperit in eodem libro contra Maximinum dicens: « Trinitas haec unius eiusdemque substantiae est, quia non de aliqua materia vel de nihilo est Filius, sed de quo est genitus. Itemque Spiritus santus non de aliqua materia vel de nihilo est, sed inde est, unde procedit ». His utique verbis aperte ostendit, ea ratione dici Filium esse de substantia Patris, quia est de Patre genitus, ita quod est eiusdem substantiae cum eo: et[14] Spiritum sanctum esse de substantia Patris et Filii, quia ab utroque procedit, ita quod est eiusdem substantiae.

By these aforesaid words there seems to be hinted, that the Divine Substance[11] begot the Son, and that the Son has been begotten from the Substance of the Father, and that He is the coeternal Nature from God, and that the Father begot that which He Himself is. Moreover that which He Himself is, is the Divine Essence; and thus it can be thought, that the Divine Essence has begotten. Vehemently do these words, which are to be understood in this manner, move us, I would prefer to hear (them) from others than to betray (them).[12] However that I may speak without prejudice and [atque] temerity, from this sense there can be accepted the sayings [dicta]: He is the coeternal Nature from God, that is, the Son coeternal to the Father is from the Father, in such a manner [ita] that He is the same Nature with Him and/or of the same Nature. Which sense (St.) Augustine confirms, subjecting (himself) to the same (opinion)[13] and as if explaining what he had said. For to the saying: « He is the coeternal Nature from God », he added: « The Son is not an other (thing) [aliud] than That from whom He is, that is, He is of one and same Substance ». Then more openly uncovers that such an understanding of [ex] the aforesaid words shall be held, saying in the same book <u>Against Maximinus</u>: « This Trinity is of one and the same Substance, because not from some matter and/or from nothing is the Son, but from Whom He has been begotten. And likewise the Holy Spirit is not from some matter and/or from nothing, but is from That [inde], whence He proceeds ». Certainly [utique] by these words he openly shows, that for this reason the Son is said to be from the Substance of the Father, because He has been begotten from the Father, in such a manner [ita] that He is of

the same Substance with Him: and[14] that the Holy Spirit is from the Substance of the Father and the Son, because He proceeds from both, in such a manner that He is of the same Substance.

---

[1] Ita codd. A B E; ceteri codd. et edd. *intelligitur*.
[2] Cap. 2. n. 10. — Paulo ante post *Scriptura* Vat. cum paucis edd. omittit *sacra*.
[3] Cap. 19. n. 37. — Locus Apostoli est Col. 1, 13, in quo textu Vulgata habet *filii dilectionis*.
[4] Vat. et edd. 4, 9 *intelligitur*.
[5] Cap. 14. n. 2.
[6] Matth. 22, 29, ubi Vulgata: *erratis nescientes*, cui concordant nostri codd. et edd. 1, 8; Vat. cum aliis edd. *non scienties*.
[7] Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 *affirmatis*; Augustinus: *affirmasti*.
[8] Loc. cit. n. 3. — Pro *utrique* codd. A B D et edd. 3, 7, 8 *utique*, sed contra originale. — Respicitur locus sacrae Scripturae I. Ioan. 5, 20.
[9] Loc. cit. n. 4. et 12. — Immediate ante Vat. *idem* loco *item* contra codd. et edd. 1, 8.
[10] Vat. cum cod. A et paucis edd. hic adiicit *Dei*.
[11] Codd. C D addunt *vel essentia* et mox post *genuerit* codd. D E *vel* pro *et*.
[12] Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 praemittit *ipse*.
[13] Libr. II. c. Maxim. c. 14. n. 2; quae sequuntur ibidem inveniuntur. — Paulo post Vat. *addit* pro *addidit*.
[14] Sola Vat. omittit *et*; in principio huius propositionis loco *utique* cod. D *itaque*.

[1] Thus codices A B and E; the rest of the codices and editions have *when . . . is understood* [cum . . . intelligitur].
[2] Chapter 2, n. 10. — A little before this at *Scripture* the Vatican text together with a few of the editions omits *Sacred* [sacra].
[3] Chapter 19, n. 37. — The quote from the Apostle is Col 1:13, in which text the Vulgate has *of the Son of His delight* [filii dilectionis].
[4] The Vatican text and editions 4 and 9 have *is understood* [intelligitur].
[5] Chapter 14, n. 2.
[6] Mt 22:29, where the Vulgate reads: *you err not knowing* [erratis nescientes], to which our codices and edition 1 and 8 agree; the Vatican text together with the other editions has *not knowing* [non scientes].
[7] The Vatican text together with editions 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 has *you affirm* [affirmatis]; (St.) Augustine wrote: *you have affirmed* [affirmasti].
[8] Loc. cit., n. 3. — In place of *both* [utrique] codices A B D and editions 3, 7 and 8 have *certainly* [utique], but contrary to the original. — The verse of Sacred Scripture alluded to is 1 Jn. 5:20.
[9] Loc. cit., n. 4 and 2. — Immediately before this the Vatican text has *(He says) the same (thing)* [idem], contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 8.
[10] The Vatican text together with codex A and a few of the editions here adds *of God* [Dei].
[11] Codices C and D add *and/or Essence* [vel essentia] and then after *begot* [genuerit] codices D and E have *and/or* [vel] in place of *and* [et].
[12] The Vatican text together with editions 4, 6, and 8 puts *myself* [ipse] before the verb.
[13] Against Maximinus, Bk. II, ch. 14, n. 2; those things which follow are found in the same place. — A little after this the Vatican text has *he adds* [addit] in place of *he added* [addidit].
[14] Only the Vatican text omits *and*; at the beginning of this proposition in place of *certainly* [utique] codex D has *and thus* [itaque].

---

p. 110

Cap. II.

Quod Filius non est de nihilo, sed de aliquo, non tamen de materia, sicut et Spiritus sanctus.

Ostenditur quoque ex illis verbis, Filium et Spiritum sanctum non esse de nihilo, sed de aliquo, nec tamen de aliqua materia. Unde etiam Hilarius in duodecimo libro de Triniate[1] ait: « Unigenitus eus, cum natus

Chapter II

That the Son is not from nothing, but from some one or thing, not however from matter, just as (is) also the Holy Spirit.*

It is also shown from those words, that the Son and Holy Spirit are not from nothing, but from some one or thing, nor, however, from some matter. Whence even (St.) Hilary in the tenth book On the Trinity[1] says: « The

sit, Patrem testatur auctorem; cum ex manente natus est, non est naturs ex nihilo; et cum ante templus natus est, omnem sensum praevenit nascendo ». Hic aperte dicitur, quod Filius non est natus ex nihilo. Similiter et Spiritus sanctus non est dicendus esse vel procedere ex nihilo, « quia Filius de substantia Patris naturs est »,[2] id est, a Patre est, cum quo est eiudem substantiae et eadem substantia. Ex quo sensu etiam accipiendum est illud: « Pater genuit id quod est ipse », id est, Filium, qui est hoc quod Pater. Et hoc ita debere intelligi Augustinus aperit, dicens in primo libro contra Maximinum:[3] « Hoc genuit Pater quod est; alioquin non est verus Filius, si quod est Pater non est Filius ». Item: « substantia Dei genuit Filium », id est, Pater substantia genuit Filium, qui est eadem substantia et eiusdem substantiae. Quod sic esse intelligendum Augustinus ostendit, dicens ad Maximinum:[4] « Sicut dicis, spiritus spiritum genuit; ita dic: spiritus eiusdem naturae vel subtantiae spiritum genuit. Item, sicut dicis: Deus Deum genuit, ita dic, Deus eiusdem naturae vel substantiae Deum genuit. HOc si credideris et dixeris, nihil de hac re ulterius accusaberis ». His enim verbis aperit, quomodo praedicta debeant intelligi. Similiter: « Filius natus est de substantia Patris, vel Pater genuit Filium de sua natura sive essentia », id est, de se natura et essentia genuit Filium eiusdem essentiae[5] ac naturae, et qui est eadem essentia ac natura. Similiter expone illud: « Filius substantiae Patris », it est[6] Filius Patris substantiae, id est, qui est substantia, cum quo et Filius eadem substantia est, quia consubstantialis est Patri Filius. Et hic sensus adiuvatur ex verbis Augustini, qui in libro septimo de Trinitate[7] ait: « Tres personas eiudem essentiae, vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus. Tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona ». His verbis ostendit, non esse dicendum, personam esse ex essentia, nisi ex sensu praedicto. Qui sensus confirmatur etiam ex eo quod in libro decimo quinto de Trinitate[8] idem ait: « Sicut nostra scientia scientiae Dei, sic et naostrum verbum, quod nascitur de nostra scientia, dissimile est illi Verbo Dei, quod naturm est de Patris essentia. Tale est

Only-Begotten God, since He has been born, testifies that the Father (is His) Author; since He has been born from the One remaining [manente], He has not been born from nothing; and since He has been born before time, He has by being born come before [praevenit] every sense ». Here there is openly said, tha the Son has not been born from nothing. Similarly also the Holy Spirit is not to be said to be and/or to proceed out of nothing, « because the Son has been born from the Substance of the Father »,[2] that is, He is by the Father, with whom He is of the same Substance and is the same Substance. From [ex] which sense there must also be accepted this: « The Father begot That which He Himself is », that is, the Son, who is This which the Father (is). And this (St.) Augustine uncovers ought to be thus understood, saying in the first book Against Maximinum:[3] « The Father begot This which He is; otherwise He is not the true Son, if what the Father is, the Son is not ». Likewise: « the Substance of God begot the Son », that is, the Father, the Substance, begot the Son, who is the same Substance and of the same Substance. Which (St.) Augustine shows must be thus understood, saying to Maximinus:[4] « Just as you say, Spirit begot Spirit; say thus: the Spirit begot a spirit of the same nature and/or substance. Likewise, just as you say: God begot God, say thus, God begot God of the same nature and/or substance. If you believed and said this, you would be accused nothing further concerning this matter [re] ». For by these words he uncovers, in what manner the aforesaid (words) ought to be understood. Similarly: « The Son has been born from the Substance of the Father, and/or the Father has begotten the Son from His own Nature or Essence », that is, from Himself, the Nature and Essence, He begot the Son of the same Essence[5] and Nature, and Who is the same Essence and Nature. Similarly he expounds this: « The Son of the Substance of the Father », that is[6] the Son of the Father's Substance, that is, He who is the Substance, with whom the Son is also the same Substance, because consubstantial to the Father is the Son. And here the sense is assisted from the words of (St.) Augustine,

autem, ac si dicerem: de Patris scientia, de Patris sapientia, vel quod est expressius, de Patre essentia, de Patre scientia, de Patre sapientia ». Ex hoc itaque intellectu Verbum Dei Patris, unigenitus Filius, per omnia Patris similis et aequalis, recte dicitur Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, sapientia de sapientia, essentia de essentia; quia est hoc omnino quod Pater, non[9] tamen Pater, quia iste est Filius, ille Pater.

who in the seventh book <u>On the Trinity</u>[7] says: « That the Three Persons (are) of the same Essence, and/or that the Three Persons (are) the one Essence we do say. But that the Three Persons (are) out of the same Essence we do not say, as if There what the Essence is were one thing [aliud], what a Person is another ». By these words he shows, that it must not be said, that a Person is out of the Essence, except in [ex] the aforesaid sense. The sense of which is confirmed also from that which the same (author) says in the fifthteenth book <u>On the Trinity</u>:[8] « Just as our knowledge [scientia] is dissimilar to God's knowledge, so also our word, which is born from our knowledge, to that Word of God, which has been born from the Father's Essence. Moreover it is such, as if I would say: from the Father's Knowledge, from the Father's Wisdom, and/or what is more expressly, the Essence from the Father, the Knowledge from Father, the Wisdom from the Father ». And thus from this understanding the Word of God the Father, the Only-Begotten Son, in [per] all things the like and equal of the Father, is rightly called God from God, Light from Light, Wisdom from Wisdom, Essence from Essence; because He is entirely This which the Father (is), not[9] however the Father, because This One (is) the Son, That One the Father.

Cap. III.

Quare Verbum Patris dicatur Filius naturae.

Inde est, quod solus Unigenitus Dei dicitur natura Filius, quia eiusdem naturae est et eadem natura est cum Patre. Unde Hilarius in libro quinto de Trinitate[10] de Christo loquens ait: « Natura Filius est, quia eandem naturam, quam ille qui genuit, habet ».

Chapter III

Why the Word of the Father is called the Son of (His) Nature.

Hence it is, that the Only-Begotten of God alone is called [dicitur] the Son by nature, because He is of the same Nature and is the same Nature with the Father. Whence (St.) Hilary in the fifth book <u>On the Trinity</u>, speaking of Christ says: « By nature He is the Son, because He has the same Nature, which He who begot (Him has) ».

---

[1] Num. 25.
[2] August. de Fide et symb. c. 4. n. 6. Verba sequentia: Pater genuit id quod ipse est, ibid. c. 3. n. 4; cfr. supra c. 1.
[3] Cap. 18. — Quod sequitur est ex libr. II. c. 14; vide supra c. 1 post medium. In eodem cap. 14. occurunt alii textus, ex quibus propositiones, quae hic explicantur, sumtae sunt.
[4] Libr. II. c. 15. n. 3. — Codd. B C in principio textus:

---

[*] [Trans. note: Here the Latin *aliquo*, which can be either masculine or neuter in gender, can be read as *someone* and/or *something*, the ambiguity of which is essential to the context of the discussion, and hence *aliquo* must be rendered into English as *some one or thing*, to make this opposition of *not however from matter* intelligible.]
[1] Number 25.
[2] (St.) Augustine, <u>On the Faith and the Creed</u>, ch. 4,

Spiritus sanctus, Spiritum sanctum; deinde cod. C prosequitur: *genuit, ita est sicut dicis Deum Deus genuit, ita dic*.
[5] Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *substantiae*.
[6] Edd., exceptis Vat., 1 et 8, non bene *et* pro *id est*.
[7] Cap. 6. n. 11. — Vat. cum plurimis edd. addiicit *his* ante *verbis August*. — Paulo infra codd. et ed. 1 *ostendit*, et cod. C addit *Augustinus*. Ceterae edd. *ostenditur*.
[8] Cap. 13. n. 22, in quo textu circa finem Magister adiunxit *de Patre essentia*.
[9] Cod. B *nec*.
[10] Num. 37; vide supra c. 1. circa medium.

n. 6. The following words: The Father begot that which He Himself is, ibid., ch. 3, n. 4; cf. above ch. 1.
[3] Chapter 18. — That which follows is from Bk. II, ch. 14; see above ch. 1 in the second half. In the same chapter 14 there occurs other texts, from which the propositions, which are here explained, have been taken.
[4] Bk. II, ch. 15, n. 3. — Codices B and C at the beginning of the text read: *the Holy Spirit . . . the Holy Spirit* [Spiritus sancuts, Spiritum sanctum]; then codex C continues: *begot . . ., thus it is, as you say « God begot God », thus say*.
[5] The Vatican text and editions 4 and 6 has *Substance* [substantiae].
[6] The editions, excepting 1 and 8 and the Vatican text, read not well *and* [et] in place of *that is* [id est]. [Trans. note: just before this the apparently faulty reading of an imperative expone *expound* is read as the indicative exponit *he expounds*].
[7] Chapter 6, n. 11. — The Vatican text together with very many editions inserts *these* before *words of (St.) Augustine*. — A little below this the codices and edition 1 have *he shows*, and codex C specifies the subject by adding *(St.) Augustine*. The rest of the editions have *there is shown* [ostenditur].
[8] Chapter 13, n. 22, in which text near the end Master (Peter) adjoined *the Essence from the Father* [de Patre essentia].
[9] Codex B has *nor* [nec].
[10] Number 37; see above ch. 1 about the middle.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

De comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem abstractum, qui

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

On the comparison of generation to (its) essential abstract term, which is

est essentia.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 110-114.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

In praecedenti distinctione movit Magister quaestionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem *concretum*, qualis est hoc nomen *Deus*. In praesenti movet quaestionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem *abstractum*, qui est *essentia*. Et dividitur haec pars in duas partes. In *prima* parte movet quaestionem ex comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione *termini*, videlicet utrum essentia generetur; in *secunda* in ratione *principii*, utrum essentia generet etc., ibi: *Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium* etc.

"essence".

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 110-114.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

After these there is asked, whether it must be conceded etc..

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In the preceding distinction Master (Peter) moves a question concerning the comparison of generation to (its) essential *concrete* term, which is this noun "*God*". In the present one he brings forward a question concerning the comparison of generation to (its) essential *abstract* term, which is "*essence*". And this part is divined into two parts. In the *first* part he brings forward a question from the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a *term*, namely whether the Essence is generated; in the *second* in the reckoning of a *principle*, whether the Essence generates etc., there (where he says): *Thus there also must not be said, that the Divine Essence begot the Son* etc..

---

p. 111

Item *prima* pars habet quatuor partes. In *prima* parte proponit problemata, videlicet utrum essentia generet vel generetur. In *secunda* adducit rationes tres probantes, quod essentia non generatur a Patre, ibi: *Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit* etc. In *tertia* adducit rationes in contraium, ibi: *Huic autem videtur contrarium* etc. In *quarta* et ultima solvit et exponit, ibi: *Ad quod respondemus*.

Likewise the *first* part has four parts. In the *first* part he proposes the problem [problemata], namely whether the Essence generates and/or is generated. In the *second* he adduces three reasons proving, that the Essence is not generated by the Father, there (where he says): *For that reason it must not be said, that the Father begot* etc.. In the *third* he adduces reasons to the contrary, there (where he says): *Moreover to this there seems contrary* etc.. In the *fourth* and last he solves and expounds, there (where he says): *To which we respond*.

Ita etiam non est dicendum.[1] Haec est *secunda* pars istius distinctionis, in qua

Thus it also must not be said.[1] This is the *second* part of that distinction of his, in

Magister determinat secundam partem quaestionis, quae est de comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione *principii*, et habet haec pars tres partes. In *prima* determinat istam quaestionem dicens, quod essentia non generat;[2] et hoc confirmat per rationem ducentem ad impossibile. In *secunda* vero adducit auctoritates, quae sunt directe contraria praedictae solutioni, ibi: *Praedictis videtur esse contrarium*. In *tertia* vero adducit auctoriates, ex quibus potest elici contrarietas, ibi: *Dicitur quoque, et frequenter* etc.

which Master (Peter) determines the second part of the question, which concerns the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a *principle*, and this part has three parts. In the *first* he determines that question saying, that the Essence does not generate;[2] and this he confirms through a reckoning that leads to the impossible. In the *second*, however, he adduces authorities, which are directly contrary to the aforesaid solution, there (where he says): *To the aforesaid there seems contrary*. In the *third*, however, he adduces authorities, from which there can be elicited contrarieties, there (where he says): *There is also said, and frequently* etc..

Item[3] secunda pars habet quatuor partes. In prima parte adducit auctoritates Augustinis contrarias praedictae solutioni. In secunda auctoritates adductas exponit, ibi: *Sed haec ita determinamus*. In tertia vero contra praedictas expositiones adducit auctoritates alias Hilarii, in quibus notatur expressior contrarietas, ibi: *Huic vero etiam contrarium videtur esse*. In quarta vero auctoritates praedictas explanat et explanationem[4] suam per verba Hilarii confirmat, ibi: *Sed quia haec verba sane vult*.

Likewise[3] the second part has four parts. In the first part he adduces the authorities of (St.) Augustine (which are) contrary to the aforesaid solution. In the second he expounds the adduced authorities, there (where he says): *But these we thus determine*. In the third, however, against the aforesaid expositions he adduces the other authorities of (St.) Hilary, in which there are noted more expressly the contrarieties, there (where he says): *However to this there also seems that it is contrary*. In the fourth, however, he explains the aforesaid authorities and confirms his own explanation[4] through the words of (St.) Hilary, there (where he says): *But because he wants these words to be sanely*.

Dicitur quoque, et frequenter in sacra Scriptura legitur. Haec est *tertia* pars, in qua obiicit contra solutionem per auctoritates, ex quibus *elicitur* praedictae solutionis contrarietas — quia[5] in his non dicitur, quod essentia generet vel generetur, sed quod de essentia vel substantia Patris Filius generetur — et haec pars quatuor habet particulas. In prima adducit[6] auctoritates in contrarium. In secunda vero adductas explanat, ibi: *His verbis praemissis innuitur*; ubi resumit praedictam expositionem. In tertia ex praedictorum opinione elicit quoddam corollarium, ibi: *Ostenditur quoque ex illis verbis* etc. In quarta et ultima redit ad propositum et ostendit, expositionem suam

It is also said, and frequently in Sacred Scripture it is read. This is the *third* part, in which he objects against the solution by the authorities, out of which *there is elicited* the aforesaid contrarieties to the solution — because[5] among these there is not said, that the Essence generates and/or is generated, but that from the Essence and/or the Substance of the Father the Son is generated — and this part has four smaller parts. In the first he adduces[6] authorities to the contrary. In the second, however, he explains the adduced (authorities), there (where he says): *By these aforesaid words there is hinted*; where he resumes the aforesaid exposition. In the third from the opinion of the aforesaid he elicits a certain

bonam esse, per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi: *Et hoc ita debere intelligi* etc.

corollary, there (where he says): *It is also shown from those words* etc.. In the forth and last he returns to the proposed (question) and he shows, that his exposition is good, through the authority of (St.) Augustine, there (where he says): *And that this ought to be thus understood* etc..

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

In parte ista ad intelligentiam duarum principalium partium huius distinctionis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione *principii*.
Secundo quaeritur de comparatione eiusdem ad essentiam in ratione *termini*.

Et duo quaeruntur quantum ad primam, duo vero quantum ad secundum. Quantum ad *primum* quaeritur:

Primo, utrum substantia vel essentia generet.
Secundo, utrum de substantia generetur aliquis.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

In this part for the understanding of the two principal parts of this distinction two (questions) are principally asked.

First one is asked concerning the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the reckoning of a *principle*.
Second (the other) is asked concerning the comparison of the same to essence in the reckoning of a *term*.

Two (questions) are also asked as much as regards the first (question), but two (also) as much as regards the second. As much as regards the *first* there is asked:

First, whether the Substance and/or Essence generates.
Second, whether Someone is generated from the Substance.

ARTICULUS I.

De comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione principii.

Quaestio I.

Utrum substantia sive essentia generet.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod substantia non generet, ostenditur sic.

1. Generare dicit relationem: ergo cui convenit generare, convenit et[7] referri; sed essentiae non convenit referri: ergo nec generare.

2. Item, generare important distinctionem: ergo cui convenit generare, per consequens et[8] distingui; sed essentia cum sit una, non distinguitur: ergo etc. Aut si generat, plures sunt essentiae. Et ad haec duo inconvenientia ducit Magister.[9]

ARTICLE I

On the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the reckoning of a principle.

Question 1

Whether the Substance or Essence generates.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that the Substance does not generate, it is shown thus:

1. 'To generate' means (that there is) a relation: therefore 'to generate' befits [convenit] the one to whom, 'to be referred' also[7] befits; but it does not befit the Essence to be referred: therefore neither to generate.

2. Likewise, to generate conveys a distinction: therefore 'to generate' befits the one to whom, by consequence[8] 'to be distinguished' also (befits); but the Essence, since it is one, is not distinguished: ergo etc.. Or if It generates, there are more Essences. And towards these two unfitting

(conclusions) Master (Peter) leads (the reader).[9]

3. Item, generare dicit actionem personalem: ergo de illo solo dicitur, quod significat personam / vel supponit personam; . . .

3. Likewise, 'to generate' means a personal action: therefore of that alone it is said, that it signifies a Person / and/or supposes a Person; . . .

[1] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omittendo *Ita etiam non est dicendum*, et variando constructionem praeponit verbo *secunda* particulam *Similiter*. Item in fine propositionis legit *principii, habet tres partes*. Idem recurrit infra pro tertia parte. In medio propositionis habet *in comparatione* loco *de comparatione*, sed male.
[2] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit hic *sed*.
[3] Supllevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *Item*, post quod emendavimus Vat. et mss. substituendo cum ed. 1 *secunda* loco *prima*, quod manifest est falsum.
[4] Vat. *expositionem*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
[5] Haec parenthesis explicat, quare dicitur *elicitur*, scil. quia illae auctoritates non explicite continent contrarium assertionem.
[6] Plures mss. cum ed. 1 *inducit*.
[7] Vat., omisso non bene *et*, infine argumenti post *nec* repetit *convenit*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
[8] Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet *et per consequens etiam*.
[9] Hic c. 1.

[1] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, by omitting *Thus it also must not be said* [Ita etiam non est dicendum], and by varying the construction places the particle *Similarly* [Similiter] before *the second*. Likewise at the end of the proposition it reads *of a principle, has three parts* [principii, habet tres partes]. The same recurs below for the third part. In the middle of the proposition it has *is in the comparison* [est in comparatione] in place of *concerns the comparison* [est de comparatione], but badly.
[2] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 adds *but* [sed] here [trans. note: which renders the opening *but this he also* rather than *and this he*].
[3] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *Likewise* [Item], after which we have emended the Vatican edition and the manuscripts by substituting together with edition 1 *second* [secunda] in place of *first* [prima], which is manifestly false.
[4] The Vatican editions has *exposition* [expositionem], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
[5] This parenthetical remark explains why *there is elicited* [elicitur] is said, namely because those authorities do not explicitly contain a contrary assertion.
[6] Very many manuscripts together with edition 1 read *he induces* [inducit].
[7] The Vatican edition, having omitted *and* [et] not well, at the end of the argument after *neither* repeats *does it befit* [convenit], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
[8] Thus very many codices together with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, which has *also by consequence* [etiam per consequens].
[9] Here in ch. 1.

p. 112

vel supponit personam; sed essentia non significat[1] personam, cum sit communis, nec personam supponit, cum sit omnino abstractum: ergo etc.

and/or supposes a Person; but the Essence does not signify[1] a Person, since It is common (to Each), nor does it suppose a Person, since It is entirely abstract: ergo etc..

4. Item, generare est proprietas personae, communicabilitas[2] est essentiae: ergo sicut se habet communicabilitas ad personam, ita proprietas personalis ad essentiam; sed communicabilitas nunquam est personae,

4. Likewise, 'to generate' is a property of a Person, communicability[2] is (a property) of the Essence: therefore just as communicability is held [se habet] regarding a Person, so a personal property

quia haec est falsa: Pater est communicabilis; ergo nec proprietas personalis erit essentiae: ergo nec generare, cum sit personae.

regarding the Essence; but communicability never belongs to a Person, because this is false: ‘The Father is communicable’; therefore neither will a personal property belong to the Essence: therefore neither ‘to generate’, since it belongs to a Person.

Contra: 1. Quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est idem alii, et non habent diversas proprietates, quidquid dicitur de una, et de altero;[3] sed persona et essentia sunt huiusmodi, quia persona est essentia, nec habent diversas proprietates, quia proprietas in divinis est relatio distinguens; sed si essentia haberet aliquam proprietatem, tunc distingueretur et referretur: ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod quamvis persona et essentia non habeant diversas proprietates, tamen differunt per *habere* proprietatem et *non habere*; *contra*: summa oppositio est contradictio;[4] sed talis diversitas est per contradictionem: ergo magis differunt essentia et persona quam persona et persona; sed persona non praedicatur de persona: ergo nec persona de essentia; hoc autem est falsum: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. Whatever are held [se habent] thus, because one is the same as the other [alii], and do not have diverse properties, whatever is said of one, (is) also (said) of the other;[3] but “person” and “essence” are of this kind, because a person is an essence, nor do they have diverse properties, because property in the divine is a distinguishing relation; but if the Essence had some property, then it would be distinguished and referred: ergo etc.. *If you say*, that although a Person and the Essence do not have diverse properties, however they differ through *having* a property and *not having* (one); *on the contrary*: a most high opposition is contradiction;[4] but such a diversity is through a contradiction: therefore the Essence and a Person are more different than a Person and a Person; but a Person is not predicated of [de] a Person: therefore neither a Person of the Essence; but this is false: ergo etc..

2. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum praedicatur de altero, unum supponit pro altero, quia subiectum vere subiicitur praedicato;[5] sed essentia vere praedicatur de Patre; unde haec est vera: Pater est essentia: ergo et supponit: ergo sicut Deus Pater generat, sic potest dici, essentia generat.

2. Likewise, whatever are held thus, because one is predicated of the other, one substitutes for the other, because a subject is truly subjected to a predicate;[5] but the Essence is truly predicated of the Father; whence this is true: “The Father is the Essence”: therefore it also supposes: therefore just as God the Father generates, so there can be said, “the Essence generates”.

3. Item, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio;[6] sed generare est sicut propria passio Patris; sed haec est vera: divina essentia est Pater: ergo et haec similiter: divina essentia generat.

3. Likewise, of whatever there is predicated a subject, (there is) also (predicated) a proper passion;[6] but “‘to generate” is as [sicut] the proper passion of the Father; but this is true: “the Divine Essence is the Father”: therefore also this similarly: “the Divine Essence generates”.

4. Item, de quocumque praedicatur definitum, et definitio;[7] sed definitio *patris* est *filii pater*. Cum igitur haec sit vera:

4. Likewise, of whatever there is predicated (something) definite, (there is) also

divina essentia est Pater, et haec erit vera: divina essentia est Filii Pater: ergo a convertibili: Filius est Filius essentiae.

(predicated its) definition;[7] but the definition of "*father*" is 'a *father of a son*'. Therefore since this be true: "the Divine Essence is the Father", this also will be true: "the Divine Essence is the Father of the Son": therefore by (what is) convertible: "The Son is the Son of the Essence".

CONCLUSIO.

Haec locutio: divina essentia generat, est omnino impropria et neganda, vel saltem pie exponenda.

CONCLUSION

This saying: "the Divine Essence generates", is entirely improper and to be denied, and/or at least to be piously expounded.

R**ESPONDEO**: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod fides vera[8] dicit quasi fundamentum, Deum esse trinum et unum, et ita trinum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita unum, quod unitas non multiplicatur. Si ergo quod credimus oportuit significare, opportune inventa sunt nomina in divinis, immo a Deo nobis manifestata, quae significent trinitatem sub distinctione et unitatem sine omni multiplicatione. Sicut igitur nomina imposita personis omnino sunt incommunicabilia et quantum ad suppositum et quantum ad significatum; unde haec oratio[9] est falsa: Pater est Filius, vel Pater est communicabilis; ita ex parte essentiae vel naturae oportuit nomina imponi, quae non distinguerentur nec quantum ad significatum nec quantum ad suppositum.

I **RESPOND**: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that the True Faith[8] professes [dicit] a quasi-foundation, that God is Triune and One, and so triune, that the Trinity is not confounded [confunditur], and so one, that the Unity is not multiplied. If, therefore, it was proper to signify what we believe, there have been opportunely found names among the divine, nay rather manifested to us by God, which signify the Trinity under a distinction and the Unity without any multiplication. Therefore just as the names imposed upon a Person are entirely incommunicable both as much as regards the Supposit and as much as regards the signified; whence this statement [oratio][9] is false: "the Father is the Son", and/or "the Father is communicable"; thus on the part of the Essence and/or Nature it was proper to impose names, which were not distinguished neither as much as regards the signified nor as much as regards a Supposit.

Notandum autem, quod triplex est genus nominum significantium essentiam. Quaedam enim significant in *concretione*, ut hoc nomen *Deus*; quaedam in *omnimoda abstractione*, ut hoc nomen *essentia*; quaedam *medio modo*, ut *lumen, sapientia, voluntas* et consimilia; et ista dicuntur medio modo significare, quia non concernunt suppositum per modum inhaerentiae, sed concernunt suppositum ratione eius, quod dicunt aliquam rationem actus vel originis, quae sunt ipsorum suppositorum. Cum igitur tres sint nominum differentiae, nomen *concretum* supponit pro persona proprie; nomen

Moreover it must be noted, that threefold is the genus of Names signifying the Essence. For certain ones signify in *concretion*, as (does) this noun *God*; certain ones in *every manner of abstraction*, as (does) this noun *essence*; certain ones *in a middle manner*, as (do) *light, wisdom, will* and those entirely similar [consimilia]; and those are said to signify in a middle manner, because they do not concern the Supposit through a manner of inherence, but rather they concern the supposit through the reckoning of this, that they mean some reckoning of act and/or origin, which belongs to the Supposits Themselves. Therefore since there are

medium supponit partim proprie, partim improprie; nomen *abstractum* et absolutum non supponit nisi omnino improprie.[10]

three (kinds) of Names of difference, a *concrete* noun supposes on behalf of a Person properly; a *middle* noun supposes partly properly, partly improperly; an *abstract* and absolute noun does not suppose except entirely improperly.[10]

Unde haec est propria: Deus generat, et in usum adducenda; haec autem: sapientia generat[11] de sapientia, partim propria, partim impropria; ideo est sustinenda, sed non extendenda; haec autem: essentia generat, omnino *impropria*, et ideo neganda est, et si legatur alicubi, est exponenda. Sancti enim / quandoque ad confundendas haereses . . .

Whence this is proper: "God generates", and is to be put [adducenda] to use; but this: "Wisdom generates[11] from Wisdom", (is) partly proper, partly improper; for this reason it is to be sustained, but not to be extended; but this: "the Essence generates", (is) entirely *improper*, and for that reason it is to be denied, and if it is read anywhere, it is to be explained [exponenda]. For the Saints / speak more expressly to confound heresies . . .

[1] Vat. cum cod. cc ordina inverso point hic *supponit* pro *significat* et mox *significat* pro *supponit*, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.
[2] Multi codd. ut A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc. ter *communitas* loco *communicabilitas*, sed minus bene.
[3] Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. — Mox post *quia* cod. O addit *quidquid est*.
[4] Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 15. (IX. c. 4): Horum (oppositorum) primum contradictio.
[5] Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 7. (VI. c. 3.): Subiectum autem est, de quo cetera dicuntur. Cfr. et libr. Praedicam. in princ. — Paulo ante post *quod unum* cod. Z adiungit *vere et essentialiter*; cod. O vero paulo infra post *de altero* addit *essentialiter* et in fine argumenti habet *ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat*.
[6] Aristot., I. Topic. c. 7. (c. 6) ait: Hoc enim erat proprium, quod conversim (de re sive subiecto) praedicatur. — Cod. M. addit hic *illius subiecti*. In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *ergo et similiter illa est vera* pro *ergo et haec similiter*.
[7] Cfr. Aristot., VI. Topc. c. 1 (c. 3), ubi ostendi ad bonam definitionem requiri, quod ipsa *conversim* praedicari possit de definito; et Petr. Hispan., Summula tract. de Syllog. topico. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *definitio et definitum*; sed propter formam argumenti minus bene. Codd. O Z addunt *et e converso*. Paulo infra multi codd. cum ed. 1 post *et haec* omittunt *erit vera:*; cod. H habet *ergo et haec: divina* etc.
[8] Ed. 1 *nostra* pro *vera*. Paulo infra codd. V W X *et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas*; lectio certe quoad sensum praeferenda. Mox cod. I cum ed. 1 post *ergo* addit *hoc*.
[9] Codd. V X Z *omnino* pro *oratio*. Paulo infra cod. T (ab altera manu correctus) *quibus non distingueretur* loco *quae non distinguerentur*.
[10] Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 transponit non ita bene *non supponit omnino nisi improprie*.
[11] Codd. M Y Z hic addunt *vel sapientia*. Mox Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit *sed non extendenda*; cod. O *ideo est distinguenda et non extendenda*.

[1] The Vatican edition together with codex cc, having inversed the order, puts *suppose* [supponit] here in place of *signify* [significat] and then *signify* in place of *suppose*, but the more ancient codices together with edition 1 withstand this.
[2] Many codices, such as A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc., have *community* [communitas] in place of *communicability* [communicabilitas] three times, but less well.
[3] Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VII, ch. 1. — Then after *because* [quia] codex adds *whatever is* [quidquid est].
[4] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 15 (Bk. IX, ch. 4): Of these (opposites) the first (is) contradiction.
[5] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 7 (Bk. VI, ch. 3): Moreover it is the subject, of which the rest are said. Cf. also the book On Predicaments, at the beginning. — A little before this after *because one* [quod unum] codex Z adjoins *truly and essentially* [vere et essentialiter]; but codex O a little below this after *of the other* [de altero] adds *essentially* and at the end of the argument has *therefore just as God generates, because the Father generates* [ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat].
[6] Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 7 (ch. 6) says: For this was proper, because it is conversely predicated (of a thing or subject). — Codex M adds here *of that subject* [illius subiecti]. At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *therefore also similarly that is true* [ergo et similiter illa est vera] in place of *therefore also this similarly* [ergo et haec similiter].
[7] Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 1 (ch. 3), where he shows that for a good definition there is required, that it be able to be conversely predicated of the (thing) defined; and Peter of Spain, Summula., tract "de Syllog. topico". The Vatican edition contrary to very many codices and edition 1 has *a definition, (there is) also (predicated something) definite* [definition et definitum]; but on account of the form of the argument (this reading is) less good. Codices O and Z add *and conversely* [et e converso]. A little below this the codices together with edition 1 after

and this [et haec] omit *will be true:* [erit vera:]; codex H has *therefore also this: the Divine* etc. [ergo et haec: divina etc.].

[8] Edition 1 reads *our* in place of *the True* [vera]. A little below this codices V W and X have *and so one, that the Trinity is not confused, and so triune, that the Unity* [et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas]; a reading certainly to be preferred according to its sense. Then codex I together with edition 1 after *therefore* has *this which* [hoc quod] in place of *what* [quod].

[9] Codices V X and Z have *is entirely* [omnino est] in place of *statement is* [oratio est]. A little below this codex T (corrected by the other hand) has *by which one would not distinguish* [quibus non distingueretur] in place of *which were not distinguished* [quae non distinguerentur].

[10] The Vatican edition contrary to the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 transposes this as *does not suppose entirely except improperly* [non supponit omnino nisi improprie], but not so well.

[11] Codices M Y and Z here add *and/or Wisdom* [vel sapientiae]. Then the Vatican edition contrary to the older codices and edition 1 omits *but not to be extended* [sed non extendenda]; codex O has *therefore it is to be distinguished and not extended* [ideo est istinguenda et non extendenda].

---

quandoque ad confundendas haereses expressius loquuntur, quam proprietas sermonis sustineat.

speak more expressly to confound heresies whenever a peculiarity [quandoque . . . quam proprietas] of discourse supports (them).

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod essentia et persona non habent diversas proprietates; dicendum, quod diversitas rationis dupliciter[1] est in divinis. *Uno modo* per *habere diversas* proprietates; et illud inducit distinctionem, et sic differunt ratione nec praedicantur de eodem, ut Pater et Filius; *alio modo* est per *habere* proprietatem et *non habere*; et illud non inducit distinctionem nec facit, quod unum non praedicetur de altero; facit tamen, quod aliquid dicitur de uno, quod non dicitur de altero, ut patet in *Petro* et *homine*: Petrus est individuum, homo non; et tamen homo vere praedicatur de Petro.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected, that the Essence and a Person do not have diverse properties; it must be said, that there is a diversity of reckoning in a twofold manner[1] among the divine. *In one manner* through *having diverse* properties; and that induces a distinction, and thus they differ by a reckoning and are not predicated of the same (thing), as (are) the Father and the Son; *in another manner* (the diversity of reckoning) is through *having* and *not having* a property; and that does not induce a distinction nor causes (one), because one is not predicated of the other; it does, however, cause that something is said of one, which is not said of the other, as is clear in "*Peter*" and "*man*": Peter is an individual, man is not; and, nevertheless [tamen], "man" is truly predicated of "Peter".

Ad illud, quod *summa* oppositio est affirmationis et negationis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi negatio nihil ponit, sicut inter aliquid et nihil; sed ubi ponit extrema, *minima* potest esse et surgit ex quantulacumque parva differentia sive rei sive rationis; unde non sufficit ad distinguendum.

To that, that a *most high* opposition belongs to affirmation and negation; it must be said, that it is true, where negation posits nothing, just as (it is) among something and nothing; but where it posits an extreme (opposition), there can be a *minimum* (opposition) and (this) rises from howsoever small the difference is small whether of the thing or of the reckoning; whence (the difference) is not sufficient to be distinguished.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod praedicatum supponit pro subiecto; dici potest *uno modo*, quod — sicut in inferioribus est praedicatio secundum *substantiam*, ut homo est animal, et est praedicatio secundum *rationem*, ut animal est genus; et praedicatum[2] supponit pro eo de quo praedicatur secundum substantiam, sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem, quae est secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; unde non sequitur: animal est genus, homo est animal, ergo homo est genus — *similiter* dicunt in divinis, quod cum sint ibi *res* et *ratio*, est ibi praedicatio secundum substantiam; et illa salvata, quidquid dicitur de praedicato, et de subiecto; sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; et talis est hic:[3] Pater generat; sed divina essentia est Pater: ergo divina essentia generat.

2. To that which objected second, that a predicate substitutes for a subject; it can be said *in one manner*, that — just as among inferiors there is predication according to *substance*, as “man is an animal”, there is also predication according to *reckoning*, as “animal is a genus”; and a predicate[2] supposes on behalf of that of which it is predicated according to substance, but with a predication according to substance changed into a predication, which is according to reckoning, there (the predicate) is an accident; whence it does not follow: ‘animal is a genus, man is an animal, therefore man is a genus’ — *similarly* they say among divine (things), that since there is *thing* and *reckoning* There, there is predication according to substance There; and so long as that (predication) remains [illa salvata], whatever is said of the predicate, (is) also (said) of the subject; but with a predication according to substance changed into a predication according to reckoning, there (the predicate) is an accident; and such is in this:[3] The Father generates; but the Divine Essence is the Father: therefore the Divine Essence generates’.

Sed ista similitudo non videtur conveniens, quia in divinis *ratio*[4] praedicatur de essentia, unde haec est vera: essentia est paternitas et generatio; quod quidem in inferioribus non reperitur. Et[5] propterea aliter dicendum, quod in divinis est duplex modus praedicandi: per *identitatem* et per *inhaerentiam*. Per *identitatem*, ut cum dicitur: essentia est Pater; per *inhaerentiam* sive denominationem, sicut faciunt adiectiva et verba.[6] Praedicatio per *identitatem* est in divinis ratione summae

But that similitude does not seem fitting [conveniens], because among the divine a *reckoning*[4] is predicated of the Essence, whence this is true: ‘the Essence is the Paternity and the generation’; which indeed is not discovered among inferiors. And[5] on this account it otherwise must be said, that among the divine there is a twofold manner of predicating: through *identity* and through *inherence*. Through *identity*, as when there is said: “the Essence is the Father”; through *inherence* or

simplicitatis, quae non patitur personam minus esse simplicem quam essentiam; quae quia non est in creaturis, ideo in eis non reperitur praedicatio per *identitatem omnimodam* nisi idem enuntietur de se, ut cum dicitur: humanitas est humanitas; sed omnis propria praedicatio est[7] per *inhaerentiam*, quia nihil est omnino simplix; unde haec est falsa: humanitas est animalitas. In praedicatione vero per *inhaerentiam* terminus[8] aliud significat et aliud supponit, quia significat formam communem et supponit pro inferiori, et in tali verum est, quod illud quod praedicatur de altero, supponit pro illo. Sed in praedicatione per *identitatem* idem significat et supponit. Unde tunc est sensus, quod significatum per hunc terminum *Pater* est idem, quod significatum per hunc terminum *essentia*, et ideo paternitas est essentia; et quia hoc nomen essentia non significat personam, ideo pro ispa non supponit, cum nullo modo de ipsa praedicetur nisi praedicatione per *identitatem*.

denomination, just as adjectives and verbs do [faciunt].[6] Predication through *identity* is in divine (things) by reason of the most high Simplicity, which does not suffer a Person to be less simple than the Essence; which because is not in creatures, for that reason among them there is not discovered a predication through *an omnimodal identity* unless the same is enunciated of itself, as when there is said: “humanity is humanity”; but every proper predication is[7] through *inherence*, because nothing is entirely simple; whence this is false: “humanity is animality”. However in predication through *inherence* a term[8] signifies one thing and supposes another, because it signifies a common form and supposes on behalf of an inferior, and in such (a case) it is true, that it supposes on behalf of that, which is predicated of the other. But in predication through *identity* it signifies and supposes the same (thing). Whence the sense then is, that which (has) been signified through this term *Father* is the same, (as) that which (has) been signified through this term *essence*, and for that reason the Paternity is the Essence; and because this noun “essence” does not signify a Person, for that reason it does not suppose on behalf of it, since in no manner is it predicated of it except by a predication through *identity*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de passione et subiecto et consimilibus, dicendum, quod *quaedam* sunt vocabula in divinis substantialia, quae claudunt intra se rem, circa quam ponunt formam importatam per ipsa, ut hoc nomen Pater; et talia possunt praedicari per *identitatem*, ut cum dicitur: essentia est Pater, id est, ille qui est Pater. *Quaedam* sunt, quae sunt omnino in adiacentia, sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta,[9] ut *generat* et *genitus* et *natus*; et talia ponunt rem suam circa ea, de quibus praedicantur, ideo tantum per *inhaerentiam* praedicantur. Et ideo generare ponit distinctionem, quam importat, circa essentiam, cum de ea dicitur; et ideo haec est falsa: essentia generat; haec tamen vera: essentia est generatio. Et quando a praedicatione per *identitatem* itur[10] ad praedicationem per *inhaerentiam*, potest

3. To that which is objected third concerning passion and subject and things completely similar, it must be said, that *certain* words [vocabula] among divine (things) are substantial, which enclose within themselves a thing, about which they posit the form conveyed by themselves, as this noun “Father” (does); and such can be predicated through *identity*, as when there is said: “the Essence is the Father”, that is, “that One who is the Father”. There are *certain* (words), which are entirely for [in] the (words) adjacent (to them), just as verbs and names used as adjectives [adiective retenta],[9] as (are) “*generates*” and “*begotten*” and “*born*”; and such posit their own meaning [rem suam] about those, of which they are predicated, for that reason they are predicated only through *inherence*. And for that reason “to generate” places a

esse ibi accidens. Quod ergo dicitur; de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria / passio, . . .

distinction, which it conveys, about the Essence, when it speaks of these; and for that reason this is false: “the Essence generates”; this, however, true: “the Essence is the generation”. And when from a predication through *identity* one passes [itur][10] to a predication through *inherence*, there it can be an accident. That which is therefore said: “of whatever there is predicated a subject, (there is) also (predicated) a proper / passion”, . . .

---

[1] Nonnulli codd. ut T V Y cum ed. 1 *duplex*, et paulo infra multi codd. ut A C G K L R S T V X etc. post *et* addunt *per*, sed minus apte. Deinde sensu non mutato codd. D T *nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater*. Cfr. de hoc d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. Cod. X post *eodem* legit glossando *unde ait est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius*.
[2] Plures codd. ut A B C L R S U X bb cum ed. 1 falso *praedicatio* loco *praedicatum*, et paulo infra post *praedicatione* omittunt multi codd. ut A F G I K T aa etc. cum ed. 1 non bene *secundum substantiam*.
[3] Vat. et codd. cc contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 non bene *haec*; cod. X *ibi*.
[4] Cod. Y *relatio*. *Ratio* hic stat pro *relatio*, cfr. supra p. 58, nota 1.
[5] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *Et*.
[6] Codd. I X addunt *sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat*. — De duplici ratione praedicandi vide infra d. 34. q. 2.
[7] Cod. W hic addit *lla quae est superioris respectu inferioris*; codd. aa bb vero *superioris de inferiore est*; cod. H tandem *in creaturis*.
[8] Codd. L O addunt *communis*. Paulo infra post *pro illo* cod. T continuat constructionem *sed non in praedicatione per identitatem ubi idem*. Quoad doctrinae explicationem cfr. supra d. 4. q. 2. et 4.
[9] Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A E Q V X post *omnino* omittunt *in*, in qua lectione *adiacentia* adiective sumitur.
[10] Cod. R *infertur*, cod. W *proceditur*.

[1] Not a few codices, such as T V and Y, together with edition 1 read *twofold diversity of reckoning* [diversitas rationis duplex], and a little below this many codices, such as A C G K L R S T V X etc.,after *and* [et] add *through* [per], but less aptly. Then with the sense unchanged codices D and T read *nor is one predicated of the other, as (are) Father* [nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater]. Cf. on this d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2. Codex X after *the same (thing)*, by glossing, read *whence the one is the Person of the Father, the other (that) of the Son, the other (that) of the Holy Spirit; for that reason one is not predicated of the other, as “the Father is the Son”* [unde ait est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius.]
[2] Very many codices, such as A B C L R S U X and bb, together with edition 1 falsely have *the predication* [praedicatio] in place of *the predicate* [praedicatum], and a little below this after *with a predication* [praedicatione] many codices, such as A F G I K T aa etc., together with edition 1 omit *according to substance* [secundum substantiam], but not well.
[3] The Vatican edition and the codex cc, contrary to the ancient codices and edition 1 have *this* [haec]; codex X has *here* [ibi].
[4] Codex Y reads *relation* [relatio]. *A reckoning* [Ratio] here stands for *relation*, cf. above (d. 2, a. sole, q. 4, near the end of the body of the response), p. 58, fn. 1.
[5] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 omits *And* [Et].
[6] Codices I and X add *just as “God is just”, just as “the Father generates”* [sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat]. — Concerning the twofold relation of predicating see above d. 34, q. 2.
[7] Codex W here adds *that which is of the superior in respect of the inferior* [illa quae est superioris respectu inferioris]; codices aa and bb, however, read *of the superior concerns the inferior* [superioris de inferiore est]; codex H at the end adds *among creatures* [in creaturis].
[8] Codices L and O have *a common term* [terminus communis]. A little below this after *for the other* [pro altero] codex T continues the construction with *but not in predication through identity where (they are) the same* [sed non in praedicatione per identiatem ubi idem]. In regard to the explanation of the doctrine cf. above d. 4, q. 2 and 4.

[9] The Vatican edition not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 omits *just as verbs and nouns used as adjectives* [sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta]. A little before this very many codices such as A E Q V and X after *entirely* [omnino] omit *for* [in], in which reading *adjacent* [adjacentia] is taken as a predicate adjective.
[10] Codex R has *one infers* [infertur], codex W has *one proceeds* [proceditur].

---

passio,[1] istud habet instantiam, ubi proprietas est extranea ei, de quo praedicatur subiectum, ut haec intentio *species*, quamvis sit proprietas hominis, et homo dicatur de Petro, non tamen dicitur de eo hoc quod est *species*.

. . .also (predicated) a proper / passion",[1] that (principle) of his does have an instance, where a property is extraneous to that, of which the subject is predicated, as (is) this intention '*species*', although it be a property of man, and man is said of Peter, however there is not said of him this, that he is a "*species*".

Et si obiicias, quod[2] in divinis non cadit ratio extranei, quia non cadit ibi accidens; dicendum, quod etsi non sit extraneitas nec diversitas quantum ad *rem*, est tamen quoad *rationem* sive quoad *modum praedicandi*, qui triplex est in divinis, sicut infra patebit.[3] Unde sicut hic est accidens: essentia est persona; sed persona distinguitur: ergo et essentia; ita et in proposito.

And if you object, that[2] there does not occur among the divine a reckoning of the extraneous, because an accident does not occur There; it must be said, that even if there is not an extraneousness nor a diversity as much as regards *thing*, there is, however, in regard to *reckoning* or in regard to the *manner of predicating*, which is threefold among the divine, as will be clear below.[3] Whence just as here there is (a fallacy of the) accident: 'the Essence is a Person; but a Person is distinguished: therefore also the Essence'; thus it is in the proposed (objection).

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de hac: essentia[4] est Pater Filii; distinguitur a Praepositivo, quod Pater potest ponere suam rem sive respectum per ipsum importatum circa ipsum subiectum, quod est essentia; et tunc est locutio falsa; est enim sensus, quod essentia refertur ad Filium. *Vel* potest claudere intra se[5] rem sui substantivi, ut sit sensus: essentia est Pater Filii, id est, essentia est ille qui refertur ad Filium; et hoc modo vera est locutio, et non valet argumentum: ergo Filius est Filius essentiae, immo est ibi *accidens*. Sicut enim non sequitur: Filius refertur ad illum qui est Pater, et ille est essentia: ergo refertur vel distinguitur ab essentia; sic et in proposito.

4. To that which is last objected concerning this: 'the Essence[4] is the Father of the Son'; there is distinguished by Praepositivus, that "the Father" can posit its own thing or the looking-back, conveyed through it, about the subject itself, which is the Essence; and then the saying is false; for the sense is, that 'the Essence is referred to the Son'. *And/or* it can close within it[5] the thing of its own substantive, so that the sense is: 'the Essence is the Father of the Son', that is, 'the Essence is that One who is referred to the Son'; and in this manner the saying is true, and the argument is not valid: 'therefore the Son is the Son of the Essence', nay rather there is (a fallacy of the) *accident* there. For just as there does

not follow: ‘the Son is referred to That which is the Father, and this One is the Essence: therefore He is referred and/or distinguished by the Essence’: so (it is) also in the proposed (objection).

SCHOLION.

I. Quaestio haec est circa *principium quod* divinarum productionum, quod secundum fidem catholicam ipsae sunt divinae *personae* producentes. Conclusiones huius et primae quaestionis sequentis articuli sunt contra abbatem Iachim, cuius doctrina censurata est in Concilio Lateranensi IV. can. *de Fide catholica*, cap. Damnamus: «Nos autem, S. approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro (Lombardo), quod una quaedam res est incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis . . . et illa res non est generans nec genita nec procedens ». — Hanc doctrinam catholicam Seraphicus gravissimis argumentis confirmat.

II. In solut. ad 1 distinguit S. Doctor duplicem diversitatem rationis in divinis secundum differentiam, quae est inter *habere diversas* proprietates et *habere vel non habere unam* eandemque proprietatem, de quo cfr. hic dub. 4. et infra dist. 19. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Affirmat etiam, alteram inducere distinctionem realem, alteram non. Tres enim sunt in divinis proprietates personales, scil. paternitas, filiatio et spiratio passiva, et *habere* distinctas has proprietates inducit realem personarum distinctionem; unde etiam una nequit predicari de alia. Sed diversitas rationis, quae exsurgit ex *habere aliquam* proprietatem et eandem *non habere*, non importat realem distinctionem. Essentia enim divina non habet proprietatem generandi, quam habet Pater; nihilominus paternitas et essentia divina non distinguitur realiter et possunt de se praedicari. Nec valet argumentatio (1. ad opp.), quod *habere* proprietatem et *non habere* sint contradictorie opposita, et quod exinde maiorem differentiam inducant inter personam et essentiam, quam quae est inter personas ad invicem. Nam bene distinguit S. Doctor inter contradictionem, cuius unum extremum nihil ponit (ut inter

SCHOLIUM

I. This question is about the *principle which* [principium quod] of the divine productions, which according to the Catholic Faith are themselves the Divine *Persons* producing. The conclusions of this and of the first question of the following article are against Abbot Joachim (di Fiore), whose doctrine was censured in the Fourth Lateran Council, in the canon *On the Catholic Faith*, chapter “We damn”: « Moreover We, with the Sacred Council approving, believe and confess with Peter (Lombard), that one certain Thing is indeed the incomprehensible and ineffable . . . and that Thing is not generating nor begotten nor proceeding ». — This Catholic Doctrine the Seraphic (Doctor) confirms with the most grave arguments.

In the solution to n. 1 the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes a twofold diversity of reckoning in divine (things) according to the difference, which there is between *having diverse* properties and *having and/or not having one* same property, concerning which cf. here, doubt 4 and below distinction 19, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, at n. 4. He also affirms, that one of the two induces a real distinction, the other does not. For among the divine there are three personal properties, that is, the paternity, the filiation and the passive spiration, and *having* these distinct properties induces a real distinction of persons; whence even one cannot be predicated of the other. But the diversity of reckoning, which rises forth from *having some* property and *not having* the same one, does not introduce a real distinction. For the Divine Essence does not have the property of generating, which the Father has; nevertheless the paternity and the Divine Essence are not really distinguished and they can be predicated of themselves. Neither is the argument (1. ad opp.) valid, that *to have* a property and *to not have* are contradictorily opposed, and that from this [exinde] they induce a greater difference between a Person and the Essence, than

aliquid et *nihil*) et illam contradictionem, cuius extrema aliquid ponunt. Si unum extremum nihil ponit, non potest verificari de aliquo termino positivo, bene tamen, si aliquid ponit. Insuper minima *ratoinis* distinctio sufficit ad hoc, ut contradictoria de distinctis dicantur. Sic terminus *incommunicabilis* verificatur de paternitate et praedicatur de ipsa, non de essentia, licet haec non realiter distinguatur a paternitate. Cfr. infr dist. 26. Q. 1. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 1 per totam et d. 33. q. 2. et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1.

which is between each of the Persons themselves. For the Seraphic Doctor well distinguishes between contradiction, one extreme of which posits nothing (as among *something* and *nothing*) and that contradiction, the extreme of which posits something. If one extreme posits nothing, it cannot be verified of some positive term, however it can be [bene tamen], if it posits something. In addition the least distinction of *reckoning* is sufficient for this, that contradictories be said of distinct (things). Thus an *incommunicable* term is verified of the paternity and predicated of it, not of the Essence, though this is not really distinguished from the paternity. Cf. below distinction 26, q. 1, at n. 2, and d. 34, q. 1 throughout and d. 33, q. 2, and St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1.

III. Prima opinio in solut. ad 2. posita, quae distinguit inter praedicationem secundum substantiam et secundum rationem, Praepositivi fuisse dicitur. Secunda opinio distinguit inter praedicationem per *identitatem* et per *inhaerentiam*, sive denominationem, quae a Scoto dicitur praedicatio formalis. De hac distinctione cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3. et d. 34. q. 2. Praedicatio *identica* fit per abstracta; praedicatio per *inhaerentiam* fit semper in concreto et ratione suppositi. Differunt hae praedicationes, tum quia abstractum eandem rem significat et supponit, concretum vero saepe aliam significat et pro alia supponit (supra, d. 4. q. 1); tum quia abstractum nomen imponitur formae et a forma denominatur, concretum vero non imponitur formae, sed supposito; tum quia identica omnimodam identitatem complectitur, praedicatio vero per inhaerentiam aliquam diversitatem. Unde falsa est ratiocinatio, quae transit a praedicatione identica ad alteram et ab abstracto ad concretum; et in hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, teste S. Thom. (S. I. q. 39. a. 5.). — In creatis locum non habere praedicationem identicam in proprio sensu, est sententia communis, si excipias Franciscum Mayronis.

III. The first opinion posited in the solution to n. 2, which distinguishes between predication according to substance and according to reckoning, is said to have belonged to Praepositivus. The second opinion distinguishes between the predication through *identity* and through *inherence*, or denomination, which is called “formal predication” by (Bl. John Duns) Scotus. Concerning this distinction cf. below in d. 33, q. 3 and d. 34, q. 2. *Identical* predication comes about [fit] through abstract (terms); predication through *inherence* comes about always in a concrete (term) and by reason of a supposit. These predications differ, both because an abstract (term) signifies and supposes the same thing, but the concrete (term) often signifies one (thing) and substitutes for another (see above d. 4, q. 1); and because an abstract noun is imposed upon a form and is denominated by a form, but a concrete (noun) is not imposed upon a form, but upon a supposit; and also because identical (predication) comprises every manner of identity, but predication through inherence (comprises) some diversity. Whence false is the reasoning, which passes from identical predication to the other and from an abstract (term) to a concrete one; and in this Abbot Joachim (of Fiore) erred, as St. Thomas testifies, (Summa., I, q. 39, a. 5). — That identical predication does not have a place among created things in a proper sense, is the common sentence, if you

except Francis Mayer.

IV. Quoad ipsam conclusionem cfr. supra d. 4. a. 1. in corp. — Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 49. m. 1. a. 4. (where he removes and solves 25 contrary arguments); q. 42. m. 3. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 39. a. 5. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. ad 1. quaesit.; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. a. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 39. q. 3. n. 13; q. 4. n. 12. et a. 54. q. 3. n. 21 28. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

IV. In regard to the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 4, a. 1, in the body (of the question). — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (where he removes and solves 25 contrary arguments); and q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 39, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Ma gnus), Sent., Bk I, d. 4, a. 2, at the first question; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here 1, princ., q. 2, a. 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12, and a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21 & 28. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.

---

[1] Codd. O Z addunt *illud tamen habet veritatem, ubi subiectum praedicatur per inhaerentiam, non ubi praedicatur per identitatem. Illud*.
[2] Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *quod*, et paulo infra substituimus *etsi* pro *si*. Cod. V dein post *non sit* adiungit *ibi*.
[3] Dist. 26. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Triplex ille dicendi modus est: *essentialis, personalis, notionalis*. — Paulo infra post *ita* supplevimus fide mss. et ed. 1 non bene omissum *et*.
[4] Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 addit *divina*. Paulo infra codd. T aa bb *suam relationem* loco *suam rem*; ed. 1 autem *suam rem, id est suam relationem sive*.
[5] Plures antiqui codd. ut A I T aa bb cum ed. 1 omittunt *se*.

[1] Codices O and Z add *that (principle), however, is true, where a subject is predicated through inherence, not where it is predicated through identity. That (principle)* etc. [illud tamen habet veritatem, ubi subiectum praedicatur per inhaerentiam, non ubi praedicatur per identitatem. Illud].
[2] We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 *that* [quod], and a little below this we have substituted *even if* [etsi] in place of *si* [if]. Then codex V inserts *There* [ibi] before *there is not* [non sit].
[3] Distinction 26, a. 1, q. 1 in the body. That threefold manner of speaking is: *the essential, the personal, the notional*. — A little below this after *thus* [ita], trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied the not well omitted *also* [et].
[4] The Vatican edition contrary to the codices and edition 1 has *the Divine Essence* [essentia divina]. A little below this codices T and aa and bb have *His relation* [suam relationem] in place of *His thing* [suam rem]; but edition 1 has *His thing, that is His relation and/or* [suam rem, id est suam relationem sive].
[5] Very many ancient codices such as A I T aa and bb together with edition 1 omit *Himself* [se].

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 114-116.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum concedenda sit locutio, quod Filius generetur de substantia Patris.

S**ECUNDO QUAERITUR**, utrum sit concedendum, quod aliquis generetur de substantia Patris, ut Filius. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per multas *auctoritates* in littera[6] et maxime per illam: *Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura legitur: Pater de sua substantia genuisse Filium*; sed Scriptura non dicit nisi verum nec frequentat nisi proprium: ergo praedictus sermo est vesus et proprius.

2. Item, *ratione* ostenditur sic: quicumque est ab aliquo[1] et est ei consubstantialis, est de eius substantia; sed Filius est a Patre et

[6] Hic c. 1. post medium.

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

ARTICLE I

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 114-116.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether there is to be conceded the saying, that the Son is generated from the Substance of the Father.

S**ECOND IT IS ASKED**, whether it must be conceded, that Someone is generated from the Substance of the Father, such as the Son. And it seems, that it is so:

1. Through the many *authorities* (quoted) in the text (of Master Peter)[6] and most of all through that (which is said): *It is also said, and frequently in Scripture it is read: that Father from His own Substance has begotten the Son*; but Scripture does not say except (what is) true nor does it do (anything) frequently [frequentat] except (what is) proper: therefore the aforesaid discourse is true and proper.

2. Likewise, it is shown *by reason* thus: whosoever is by [ab] someone[1] and is consubstantial to him, is from [de] his

[6] Here in ch. 1, in the second half.

p. 115

est ei consubstantialis: ergo est de eius substantia.

substance; but the Son is by the Father and is consubstantial to Him: therefore He is from His substance.

3. Item, Pater generat Filium: aut ergo de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de nihilo, quia tunc esset creatura: ergo de aliquo;[2] non de aliquo alio a se; ergo de sui substantia.

3. Likewise, the Father generates the Son: therefore either from something [de aliquo], or from nothing; not from nothing, because then He would be a creature: therefore from something;[2] not from something other than Himself; therefore from His own substance.

4. Item, in inferioribus filius, qui habet partem substantiae a patre, dicitur esse de substantia patris: ergo multo fortius, qui habet totam substantiam, dicitur esse de substantia generantis: ergo haec est vera: Filius est de substantia Patris.

4. Likewise, among inferiors a son, who has part of (his) substance by the father, is said to be from the substance of the father: therefore much more strongly, he who has the whole substance, is said to be from the substance of the one generating: therefore this is true: 'the Son is from the Substance of the Father'.

Contra: 1. Praepositiones sunt transitivae,[3] et ubi transitio, ibi est distinctio et diversitas: ergo cum dicitur: Filius de substantia Patris, haec praepositio *de* notat distinctionem inter substantiam Patris et Filium: ergo cum nulla sit distinctio, quia Filus est substantia Patris, propositio praedicta est falsa. *Si dicas*, quod haec praepositio *de* cadit a generali significato praepositionum, retinens *speciale*: ergo est ibi soloecismus,[4] sicut si dicatur *sublime volat* pro *sublimiter*, quod stultum est dicere.

On the contrary: 1. Prepositions are transitive,[3] and where (there is) transition, there is distinction and diversity: therefore when there is said: "the Son (is) from the Substance of the Father", this preposition "*from*" [de] notes distinction between the Substance of the Father and the Son: therefore since there is no distinction, because the Son is the Substance of the Father, the aforesaid proposition is false. *If you say*, that this preposition "*from*" occurs from (that which is) generally signified by prepositions [significato praepositionum], being used in a *special* sense [retinens speciale]: therefore it is there a soloecism,[4] just as if one said "sublime does it fly" for "sublimely", which is a stupid (thing) to say.

2. Item, obiicitur de significato *speciali*. Haec praepositio *de*, prout accipitur specialiter, aliquando tenetur *materialiter*, ut cultellus de ferro; aliquando tenetur *ordinaliter*, ut de mane fit meridies, id est post mane; aliquando *originaliter*, ut si dicatur, radius de sole vel splendor de igne. Sed quocumque istorum modorum accipiatur, falsa est locutio; si *materialiter*, est falsa, quia Filus caret materia; si *ordinaliter*, falsa, quia sensus est, quod Filius sit post Patrem sive post substantiam Patris; si *originaliter*, similiter falsa quia tunc

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning (that which is) *specially* signified. This preposition "*from*" [de], insofar as it is accepted in a special manner, is sometimes had *materially*, as "a knife (made) from iron"; (and) is sometimes had *ordinally*, as "from morning midday is made", that is "after morning"; sometimes *originally*, as if one said, "a ray from the sun" and/or "the splendor from the fire". But in whatever of these manners it be accepted, the saying is false; if *materially*, it is false, because the Son lacks matter; if *ordinally*, (it is) false,

est sensus, quod Filius habeat ortum a substantia Patris; sed ista non admittitur: substantia Patris generat Filium: ergo est omni modo[5] falsa. *Si dicas*, quod nullo istorum modorum, sed tenetur quarto modo *substantialiter*; quaeritur, unde ortum habeat haec significatio et ubi consimiliter accipiatur;[6] et videtur quod hoc nihil sit, quia tunc haec esset vera: Pater est de substantia Filii, quam nemo concedit.

3. Item, hoc idem ostenditur sic: differt haec praepositio *de* et *a*: quia *a* proprie dicit habitudinem principii activi, sed haec praepositio *de* dicit habitudinem principii passivi; sed Deo et eius substantiae magis convenit ratio principii activi quam passivi: ergo haec est magis vera: Filius est *a* substantia Patris, quam *de*; sed haec non recipitur: ergo nec alia debet recipi.

4. Item, *de* aut dicit *identitatem* aut *diversitatem*; si *identitatem*: ergo cum summa identitas sit in essentia vel substantia, haec erit vera: substantia[7] de substantia, quam negat Magister; si diversitatem; sed non distinguitur substantia Patris a Filio, quia Filius est ipsa substantia Patris: ergo omnino est falsa.

CONCLUSIO.

Concedendum est, Filium generari de substantia Patris.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio est concedenda.

Et ad intelligentiam praedictorum[8] notandum, quod praeter praedictos tres modos, quibus haec praepositio *de*

because the sense is, that the Son is after the Father or after the substance of the Father; if *originally*, (it is) similarly false because then the sense is, that the Son has arisen away from [a] the Substance of the Father; but this (saying) is not admitted: "the Substance of the Father generates the Son": therefore it is in every manner[5] false. *If you say*, that (it is held) in none of those manners, but rather it is held in a fourth manner *substantially*; it is asked, "Whence has arisen this signification and where is it accepted in a completely similar manner [consimiliter]?";[6] and it seems that this is nothing, because then this would be true: "the Father is from the Substance of the Son", which no one concedes.

3. Likewise, this same is shown thus: this preposition "*from*" [de] is different and (so is) "*by*" [a]: because "*by*" properly means the habitude of an active principle, but this preposition "*from*" means the habitude of a passive principle; but to God and to His Substance the reckoning of an active principle it is more fitting [convenit] than of a passive one: therefore this is more true: "the Son is *by* the Substance of the Father", than "*from*"; but this (saying) is not received: therefore neither ought the other be received.

4. Likewise, "*from*" either means *identity* or *diversity*; if *identity*: therefore since there is a most high identity in the Essence and/or Substance, this will be true: "Substance[7] from Substance", which Master (Peter) denies; if (it means) a diversity; but the Substance of the Father is not distinguished from the Son, because the Son is the Substance itself of the Father: therefore it is entirely false.

CONCLUSION

It must be conceded, that the Son is generated from the Substance of the Father.

I **respond**: that it must be said, that the aforesaid saying is to be conceded.

And for an understanding of the aforesaid[8] it must be noted, that besides the aforesaid three manners, by which this preposition

accipitur, quarto modo etiam potest accipi, scilicet *substantialiter*, ut dicat substantialem convenientiam inter extrema; sed hac nunquam pure dicit, cum sit praepositio et importet aliquam habitudinem et respectum ad extrema. Si enim tantum substantialiter teneretur;[9] sicut dicitur: filius de substantia patris, ita diceretur: pater de substantia filii; quod absonum est.

"*from*" [de] is accepted, it can also be accepted in a fourth manner, that is *substantially*, to mean a substantial fittingness [convenientiam] between extremes; but it never purely means this, since it is a preposition and it introduces some habitude and regard [respectum] for extremes. For if it were only held substantially;[9] just as there is said: "a son (is) from the substance of a father", it would thus mean: 'a father of the substance of the son'; which sounds awry [absonum est].

Propterea notandum, quod *substantialiter* accipi consuevit tripliciter. *Aliquando* accipitur substantialiter et partialiter, ut cum dicitur, quod partes sunt de toto sive de substantia totius, ut urceus vini de dolio. *Aliquando* accipitur substantialiter et ordinaliter, ut cum dicitur: de pane fit corpus Christi; ibi enim est *ordo*, quia substantia panis non manet in corpore Christi, sicut nec mane in meridie; sed ulterius *substantialiter*, quia substantia panis transit in substantiam corporis Christi. *Aliquando* accipitur[10] substantialiter et originaliter, ut cum dicitur: Filius de substantia Patris; ratione ablativi tenetur substantialiter, ratione genitivi originaliter: et ideo importat aliquam distinctionem Filli ad Patrem, non ad eius substantiam, et ita praepositio tenet ibi generale significatum et speciale.

Moreover it must be noted, that *substantially* is accustomed to be accepted in a threefold manner. *Sometimes* it is accepted substantially and partially, as when it is said, that parts are from the whole or from the substance of the whole, as "a jug of wine from the cask". *Sometimes* it is accepted substantially and ordinally, as when there is said: "from bread the Body of Christ is made" for in this [ibi] there is an *order*, because the substance of the bread does not remain [manet] in the Body of Christ, just as neither the morning in the midday; but furthermore *substantially*, because the substance of the bread passes over into the substance of the Body of Christ. *Sometimes* it is accepted[10] substantially and originally, as when there is said: "the Son from the Substance of the Father"; by reason of the ablative it is held substantially, by reason of the genitive originally: and for that reason it conveys [importat] some distinction of the Son towards the Father, not towards His Substance, and thus the preposition holds there a general and special significance [significatum].

1. 2. Et sic patet responsio ad primum argumentum et secundum. Tamen quod dicitur, quod / praepositiones sunt transitivae, . . .

1. 2. And thus is clear the response to the first and second argument. However because it is said, that / prepositions are transitive, . . .

[1] Ex fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquo* pro *alio*.
[2] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit *et*, pro quo cod. A melius habet *sed*.
[3] [trans. nota: Hic textus criticalis legit *Propositiones*, tamen ex nn. 1 et 2 responsionis atque I. Scholionis, magis debet legere *Praepositiones*; quidem hic legitur, ut propositio maior istius argumenti sit, sed minor est *haec praepositio*, ergo etc.] Cfr. Priscian, XIV Grammat. c. 1. et seqq. — Mox post *ibi* Vat. habet *etiam est* loco *et*. Paulo infra ed. 1 verbo *nulla* praemittit satis bene

[1] From nearly all the codices and edition 1 we have substituted *something* [aliquo] for *an other* [alio].
[2] The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, adds *and* [et], in place of which codex A has the better *but* [sed].
[3] [trans. note: Here the Quarrachi text has *The propositions* [Propositiones], however it appears here from nn. 1 & 2 of the response, as well as from I. of the Scholium, that it should rather be read as *Prepositions* [Praepositiones]; indeed as it reads, it is the major proposition of the argument, the minor of which is *this preposition*: ergo etc..] Cf. Priscian,

in substantia.
[4] Priscian., XV. Grammat. c. 1: Nam si (ordinatio partium orationis) incongrua sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus.
[5] Plures codd. ut A F H K T Y etc. cum ed. 1 *omni modo*, Vat. *omnino*. — Similia habet Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 29. (IV. 24.) de praepositione *ex*. — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut K V W X post *modorum* addunt *tenetur*.
[6] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *similiter accipitur*.
[7] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit *est*. Textum Magistri vide in lit. c. 1 et 2. circa finem.
[8] Aliqui codd. ut T V addunt *est*.
[9] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *tenetur*.
[10] Substituimus ex codd. et ed. 1 *accipitur* pro *dicitur*. Paulo infra post *Filius* cod. V addit *est*.

Grammer, Bk. XIV, ch. 1 ff.. — Then after *there* [ibi] the Vatican edition has *also is* in place of *and* [et]. A little below this edition 1 prefaces the word *no* [nulla] with *in the Substance* [in substantia], well enough.
[4] Priscian, Grammar, ch. 1: For if (the ordering of the parts of an oration) be incongruous, it causes a solecism, as if the elements of the oration were arranged [coeuntibus] in an awkward manner.
[5] Very many codices, such as A F H K T Y etc., together with edition 1 have *in every manner* [omni modo], the Vatican edition has *entirely* [omnino]. — Aristotle has similar (sayings), Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 29 (Bk. IV, 24) concerning the preposition *out of* [ex]. — A little below this not a few codices, such as K V W and X, after *manners* [modorum] add *is it held* [tenetur].
[6] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *is it accepted in a similar manner* [similiter accipitur].
[7] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 adds *is* [est]. See the text of Master (Peter) above in ch. 1 and 2, near the end.
[8] Some codices such as T and V have explicitly *it must be noted* [est notandum] for *it must be noted* [notandum].
[9] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has the less well *is held* [tenetur].
[10] We have substituted from the codices and edition 1 *it is accepted* [accipitur] for *it is said* [dicitur]. A little below this after *the Son* [Filius] codex V adds *is* [est].

---

p. 116

praepositiones sunt transitivae, non intelligitur, quod notent ex hoc diversitatem necessario; sed sicut dicitur, quod obliqui[1] sunt transitivi quantum ad modum; quia transitive construuntur cum verbis, ut, video me; similiter hoc de praepositionibus dicitur, quae[2] cum obliquis construuntur.

prepositions are transitive, it is not understood, that from this they necessarily note a diversity; but just as it is said, that oblique (cases)[1] are transitive as much as regards manner; because they are transitively constructed with words, as, "I see myself"; similarly this is said of prepositions, which[2] are constructed with oblique (cases).

3. Patet etiam tertium, quod *de* non tantum dicit habitudinem principii passivi nec tantum habitudinem principii activi, sed habitudinem consubstantialem cum habitudine originis; quod non facit haec praepositio *a*; et ideo non est simile.

3. Clear also is the third, because "*from*" not only means the habitude of a passive principle nor only the habitude of an active principle, but rather a consubstantial habitude together with the habitude of an origin; which this preposition "*by*" [a] does not do; and for that reason it is not similar.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio, quia *de*[3] non dicit ibi penitus identitatem nec diversitatem, sed consubstantialitatem cum habitudine

4. To that which is objected last, the response is clear, because "from"[3] does not mean that (there is) a thorough [penitus] identity There and not a diversity, but rather

originis.

a consubstantiality with a habitude of an origin.

SCHOLION.

I. Pro intelligentia aliquorum terminorum in solut. ad 1. et alibi occurentium haec ex antiquis grammaticis notamus.

1. Duplex distinguebatur constructio *transitiva*, scil. tum *actuum* tum *personarum*. In prima constructibile dependens per modum actus significat, ut in verbis transitivis, v. g. lego librum; secunda vero est, in qua constructibile dependens per modum substantiae significat. Haec fit vel per casus obliquos (v. g. filius Socratis; similis Ciceroni) vel etiam per praepositiones, quae inde vocantur transitivae. Vide Scotum, Grammatica speculativa c. 46. usque 51., de hoc subtiliter disputantem.

2. Constructio *transitiva* secundum antiquam definitionem est illa, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa vel videntur pertinere ad diversa; *intransitiva* vero est ea, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem vel saltem ad idem videntur pertinere.

3. Quomodo casus grammaticales sint transitivi quantum ad modum significandi, late Scot. explicat ibid. c. 19.

4. Ipse S. Bonav. infra d. 37. p. I. dub. 2. docet, quod praepositiones non notent necessario diversitatem.

Ampliorem expositionem et applicationem huius solutionis exhibent Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 4. a. 2. ad 3, et Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. ad 1.

II. In conclusione doctores conveniunt. Cfr. Alex. et Richard. locc. citt. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. ad 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. p. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 53. seqq. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

SCHOLIUM

I. For an understanding of some of the terms occurring in the solution to n. 1 and elsewhere, we note these (points) of ancient grammar.

1. A twofold *transitive* construction used to be distinguished, that is both *of acts* as well as *of persons*. In the first the dependent constructible signifies through a manner of acting, as in transitive words, e. g. "I read a book"; but the second is, in which the dependent constructible signifies through a manner of substance. This is accomplished through oblique cases (e.g. "the son of Socrates"; "a similar to Cicero") and/or even through prepositions, which are thence called transitive. See (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Speculative Grammar, ch. 46-51, who disputes this point subtly.

2. A *transitive* construction according to the ancient definition is that, in which the constructibles pertain to diverse (things) and/or seem to pertain to diverse (things); but an *intransitive* (construction) is that, in which the constructibles pertain to the same (thing) and/or at least seem to pertain to the same (thing).

3. In what manner grammatical cases are transitive as much as regards (their) manner of signifying, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus explains at length, ibid., ch. 19.

4. St. Bonaventure himself below in d. 37, p. I, doubt 2, teaches, that prepositions do not necessarily note a diversity.

A more ample exposition and application of this solution is exhibited by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, at n. 3, and by Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3, at n. 1.

II. The doctors agree on the conclusion. Cf. Alexander and Richard locc. citt.. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 41, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 4. a. 2, at n. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in the 2nd princ. of q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 54, q. 3, n. 53 ff.. — Durandus, here in q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. —

(Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.

[1] Supple: casus. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *videt me* pro *video me*, sed non bene.
[2] Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungit *etiam*. Cod. H *quia* loco *quae*.
[3] Vat. ponit *quod* loco *quia* et omittit *de*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

[1] Supply: cases. — A little below this very many codices, such as A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. ,together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 read "*he sees me*" in place of "*I see myself*", but not well.
[2] The Vatican edition not trusting the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 adjoins *also* [etiam]. Codex H has *because they* [quia] in place of *which* [quae].
[3] The Vatican edition puts *that* [quod] in place of *because* [quia] and omits *from* [de], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 116-118.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

ARTICLE II

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 116-118.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS II.

De comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini.

Consequenter circa secundum articulum huius quaestionis, qui est perthis comparationem generationis ad essentiam

ARTICLE II

On the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a term.

Consequently about the second article of question, which is through the comparison of generation to essence in the

in ratione *termini*, duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.

Secundo, utrum per generationem communicetur.

reckoning of a *term*, two (questions) are asked.

First there is asked, whether a substance or an essence is generated.

Secondly, whether it is communicated through generation.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.

QUAESTIO 1

Whether a substance or an essence is generated.

QUOD AUTEM substantia generetur, sic obiicitur.[4]

1. Generatio in inferioribus est motus ad substantiam;[5] quod *motus* est, hoc est imperfectionis, quod *ad substantiam* est, hoc est perfectionis; si ergo quod est perfectionis est transferendum ad divina: ergo et generatio terminatur ad essentiam.

2. Item, generatio in divinis terminatur: aut ergo ad substantiam, aut ad accidens, quia omne ens est substantia, vel accidens;[6] sed in divinis non terminatur ad accidens, cum non sit ibi: ergo ad substantiam. *Si dicas*, quod in divinis, quamvis non sit accidens, est tamen relatio, quae distinguitur ad substantia; tunc arguitur sic: aut generatio terminabitur *ad substantiam*, aut *ad relationem*; sed non ad relationem, quia in *ad aliquid* per se non est origo, nec terminatur productio:[7] ergo terminatur ad substantiam: ergo substantia generatur.

3. Item, sicut dicit Philosophus:[8] « Motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt, et corruptis nobis, corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt »; et hoc est,

MOREOVER THAT a substance is generated, is objected in this manner.[4]

1. Generation among inferiors is a movement [motus] towards substance;[5] because what is *movement*, belongs to imperfection, what is *towards substance*, belongs to perfection; therefore if what belongs to perfection must be transferred to the divine: therefore even generation is terminated at an essence.

2. Likewise, generation among the divine is terminated: therefore either at a substance, or at an accident, because every being [ens] is a substance, and/or an accident;[6] but among the divine it is not terminated at an accident, since (this) is not There: therefore at a substance. *If you say*, that among the divine, although there is not an accident, there is however a relation, which is distinguished regarding the Substance; then it is argued thus: either generation will be terminated *at a substance*, or *at a relation*, because *at something* per se is not an origin, nor is the production terminated:[7] therefore it is terminated at a substance: therefore a substance is generated.

3. Likewise, as the Philosopher says:[8] « With us moved, there are moved those things which are in us, and with us corrupted, there are corrupted those thing which are in us »; and this is,

---

[4] Cod. H *ostenditur*.

[5] Propositio haec quoad sensum invenitur in Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.): Quae (mutatio) vero ex non esse simpliciter in substantiam est, generatio simpliciter est. Cfr. etiam I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 11-18. (c. 3.).

[6] Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Complexis et de Substantia; I. Phys. text. 26-30 (c. 3.); V. Metaph. text. seqq. (IV. c. 7.).

[7] Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10 (c. 2.): Neque etiam in ad aliquid (est motus). — Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut A I T bb *arguetur* loco *arguitur*. In fine argumenti post

[4] Codex H reads *shown* [ostenditur].

[5] This proposition according to its sense is found in Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text 7 (ch. 1): That (change), however, which is from non-being [ex non esse] simply into a substance, is simply generation. Cf. also On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, texts 11-18 (ch. 3).

[6] Cf. Aristotle, On Predicaments, ch. "On Composites and on Substance"; Physics, Bk. I, texts 26-30 (ch. 3); Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 13 ff. (Bk. IV, ch. 7).

[7] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text 10 (ch. 2): Nor (is) there even (a movement) unto "toward something".

substantiam cod. I addit *sed illud, ad quod terminatur generatio, illud generatur*.

[8] Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7), in quo textu mss. cum sex primis edd. *moventibus* pro *motis* (□□□□□□□□□□); idem recurrit infra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 37. p. II. a. 1. obiect. 3. Alteram propositionis partem invenies in Aristot., de Longit. et brevit. vitae, c. 2 his verbis: Corruptis (□□□□□□□□□□□□) enim animalibus, corrumpuntur et scientia et sanitas, quae in animalibus. — Rationem huic propositioni additam innuit Arist., II. Topic. loc. cit. et fusius probat VII. Metaph. text. 35. et 45. seqq. (VI. 10. et 13.). Post *corrumpuntur* codd. V X addunt *omnia* et cod. K *idem esse* adiungit *et eandem essentiam*.

— A little before this some codices, such as A I T and bb, have *it would be argued* [arguetur] in place of *it is argued* [arguitur]. At the end of the argument after *at a substance* [substantiam] codex I adds *but that, at which generation is terminated, that is generated* [sed ilud, ad quod terminator generation, illud generatur].

[8] Aristotle, Topics, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 7), in which text the manuscripts together with the six first editions have *being moved* [moventibus] in place of *moved* [motis] (□□□□□□□□□□); the same recurs below in d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, at n. 3, and in d. 37, p. II, a. 1, objection 3. You will find the other part of the proposition in Aristotle, On the Longevity and Brevity of Life, ch. 2, in these words: For with animals corrupted (□□□□□□□□□□□□), there is corrupted both the knowledge and health, which (was) in the animals. — Aristotle hints at an additional reason for this proposition in Topics, Bk. II, loc. cit. and he proves it more fully in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, texts 35 and 45 ff (Bk. VI, 10 and 13). After *there are corrupted* [corrumpuntuer] codices V and X adds *all* [omnia] and codex K after *to be the same* [idem esse: on the following page] adjoins *and the same essence* [et eandem essentiam].

---

p. 117

quia universale habet idem esse cum singulari: ergo cum multo magis sit eadem substantia cum persona, et substantia sit in persona, si persona generatur, et substantia.

because a universal has to be the same with the singular: therefore since much more is the Substance the same with a Person, and the Substance is in a Person, if a Person is generated, (so) also the Substance.

4. Item, *generare* tam in divinis quam in creaturis est *simile sibi producere*;[1] sed non est similitudo in persona, sed in substantia et in natura: ergo cum terminetur ad simile, in quantum est simile, ergo ad substantiam, secundum quam attenditur similitudo.

4. Likewise, '*to generate*' both among the divine and among creatures is '*to produce a (something) similar to one's self*';[1] but there is not similitude in person, but in substance and in nature: therefore since (generation) is terminated at (something) similar, inasmuch as it is (something) similar, therefore at a substance, according to which the similitude is attained.

Contra: 1. Omne quod generatur ab alio generatur, quia nihil se ipsum gignit;[2] sed substantia divina non habet alium, nec aliud est in divinis: ergo non generatur.

On the contrary: 1. Everything which is generated is generated by an other, because nothing begets its very self;[2] but the Divine Substance does not have an Other, nor is there an other (being) among the divine: therefore It is not generated.

2. Item, omne quod generatur habet principium *a quo*;[3] sed omne quod habet principium, est principiatum; sed principium et principiatum distinguuntur: si ergo substantia generatur, distinguitur: aut ergo

2. Likewise, everything which is generated has a principle *from which*;[3] but everything which has a beginning [principium], has been begun [est principiatum]; but the beginning and the begun are distinguished:

a substantia, aut a persona; sed utrumque est impossibile: ergo etc.

therefore if a substance is generated, it is distinguished: therefore either (it is distinguished) from [a] the Substance, or from a Person; but each is impossible: ergo etc..

3. Item, omne quod generatur est de substantia generantis;[4] si ergo substantia generatur, substantia vel essentia est de substantia generantis; sed non est nisi una omnino substantia: ergo idem est de se ipso, quod est impossibile.

3. Likewise, everything which is generated is from the substance of the one generating;[4] therefore if a substance is generated, the substance and/or essence is from the substance of the one generating; but there is not but entirely one Substance: therefore the Same is from its very Self, which is impossible.

4. Item, generatio est productio;[5] sed productio est quaedam actio, et omnis actio creaturae terminatur ad singularia: ergo cum generatio sit quaedam actio, in divinis terminabitur ad singulare sive suppositum; sed tale non est substantia: ergo non terminabitur ad ipsam.

4. Likewise, generation is a production;[5] but production is a certain action, and every action of a creature is terminated at singulars: therefore since generation is a certain action, in divine (things) it will be terminated at a singular or at a supposit; but such is not the Substance; therefore it will not be terminated at It.

CONCLUSIO.

Cum in divinis generatio terminetur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, non ad substantiam secundam sive essentiam, minime recipitur, quod substantia generetur.

CONCLUSION

Since generation among the divine is terminated solely at the first substance, which is a Person, not at a second substance or essence, it is not in the least [minime] received, that a substance is generated.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio de sua communi ratione ad substantiam terminatur. Sed attendendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter: *prima*, quae est individuum et hypostasis sive persona, et *secunda*, quae est commune.[6] Dico ergo, quod est loqui de termino generantis dupliciter: aut quantum ad *productionem*, aut quantum ad *intentionem*. Quantum ad productionem, cum sit circa singulare, terminatur ad substantiam primam, et[7] quantum ad intentionem ad naturam communem, quia natura producens hunc hominem intendit formam communem dare ei.

I respond: It must be said, that generation from its own common reckoning is terminated at a substance. But it must be attended to, that "substance" is said in a twofold manner: the *first*, (that substance) which is an individual and a hypostasis or person, and the *second*, (that) which is (something) common.[6] Therefore I say, that it is to be said of the terminus of one generating in a twofold manner: either as much as regards the *production*, or as much as regards the *intention*. As much as regards the production, since it is about a singular, it is terminated at the first substance, and[7] as much as regards the intention (it is terminated) at a common nature, because the nature producing this man intends to give him a common form.

Sed quoniam in creaturis forma communis numeratur in suppositis, ideo in illis forma communis producitur et corrumpitur; et ideo

But since among creatures the common form is numbered among supposits, for that reason among those a common form is

in creaturis generatio non tantum secundum intentionem, sed etiam secundum productionem ad substantiam communem terminatur; et ideo universale in singulari generatur, quia numeratur.[8] Sed quoniam in divinis substantia non numeratur nec advenit ei novum esse: ideo generatio secundum productionem terminatur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, quia persona secundum Boethium[9] « est rationalis naturae individua substantia ». Et quoniam illud solum dicitur proprie generari, ad quod terminatur generatio secundum rationem producendi: ideo persona generatur, non substantia vel essentia. Et ideo haec non recipitur: essentia generatur.

produced and corrupted; and for that reason among creatures generation not only according to intention, but also according to production, is terminated at a common substance; and for that reason a universal is generated in the singular, because it is numbered.[8] But since in the Divine Substance there is not numbered nor does something new come upon it [advenit ei novum esse]: for that reason generation according to production is terminated solely at the first substance, which is a Person, because "a person" according to (St. Severinus) Boethius[9] « is an individual substance of a rational nature ». And since that alone is said properly to be generated, generation according to a reckoning of producing is terminated at that. And for that reason this is not received: "an essence is generated".

Et sic patent omnia obiecta ad utramque partem; procedunt enim[10] diversis viis.

And thus is clear all the objections on each side; for they proceed[10] by diverse ways.

3. Patet etiam, quare in divinis non sequitur, quod, generata persona, generetur substantia, sicut in creaturis. Posset tamen aliter dici, quod non generetur commune nisi *in hoc*;[11] et non tantum in creaturis hoc verum est, sed etiam in divinis. Commune autem ut *in hoc* non significatur in abstractione, sed in concretione; et ideo, quia hoc nomen *Deus* significat substantiam in concretione,[12] Deus generatur et Deus generat Deum. Quia vero substantia vel essentia significat in abstractione, ideo nec generat nec generatur; et ita procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas.

3. It is also clear, why among the divine it does not follow, that, with a Person generated, a substance is generated, just as among creatures. However it can be otherwise said, that (something) common is not generated except *in this one*;[11] and not only among creatures is this true, but also among the divine. Moreover (something) common as "*in this one*" is not signified in abstraction, but in concretion; and for that reason, because this noun "*God*" signifies a substance in concretion,[12] "God is generated" and "God generates God". However because "substance" and/or "essence" signifies in abstraction, for that reason it neither generates nor is generated; and thus proceed the reasons on the opposite sides.

---

[1] Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.), ubi dicit, quod naturalissimum operum viventium est *facere quale ipsum*, id est generare; et text. 49: Finis est generare quale ipsum, id est simile. — Mox plerique codd. ut A C F G H I T etc. cum ed 1. *ad similem* loco *ad simile* ac dein *similis* pro *simile*.

[2] Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. — Paulo infra post *aliud* aliqui codd. ut A T V Z cc omittunt *est*, cuius loco cod. X ponit *a quo generetur*.

[3] Aristot., IV. Metaph. text 22. (ed. Venet. 1489), ubi secundum translationem arabico-latinam sic habetur: Et si generetur, necesse est, ut habeat esse illud ex quo generatur, illud quod ex eo generatur, et illud per quod generatur. Iuxta ed.

[1] Cf. Aristotle, On the Son, Bk. II, text 34 (ch. 4), where he says, that the most natural of the works of living (things) is *to make a "such as itself"* [facere quale ipsum], that is to generate; and text 49: The end is to generate a "such as itself", that is a similar. — Then very many codices, such as A C F G H I T etc., together with edition 1 have *at a similar one* [ad similem] in place of *at (something) similar* [ad simile] and then *one is similar* [est similis] in place of *it is (something) similar* [est simile].

[2] Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 47 (ch. 4): Moreover nothing itself generates its very self. — A little below this after *an other (thing)* [aliud] some codices, such as A T V Z and cc, omit *is there* [est], in place of which codex X puts *by which it is generated*

Paris. (Firmin-Didot) III. c. 5: Si fit, necesse est esse, ex quo fit, et a quo generatur.

4 Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34-50. (c. 4.), ubi de nutritione et generatione agit. — Circa finem arugmenti post *una* Vat. minus bene omittit *omnino* et post *idem* omittit *est*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

5 Sub hoc respectu Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4) actum generandi viventis definiens ait: est facere quale ipsum. De termino actionis ait Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1: Actiones autem ac generationes omnes circa singulare sunt. — In fine argumenti aliqui codd. ut A I T cum ed. 1 *terminatur* loco *terminabitur*.

6 Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia.

7 Codd. omittunt *vero* a Vat. post *quantum* additum, cuius loco voci *quantum* praemittunt plures codd. ut A F G I K S T V X Z, quos sequimur, particulam *et*, alii H P Q Y *sed*. Paulo infra fide mss. et ed. 1 post *quia* expunximus *haec*.

8 Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.).

9 Libr. de Persons et duabus naturis c. 3 in initio (ed. Migne). — Immediate post Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Sed quia* loco *Et quoniam*. — De termino generationis cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 26. seqq. (VI. c. 8.).

10 Fide mss. expunximus hic a Vat. additum *de*.

11 Hoc est, in individuo sive supposito. De quo cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. loc. cit. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. *ut in hoc*.

12 Vat. incongrue et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit *ideo in concretione*.

[a quo generetur].

3 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 22 (Venetian edition, 1489), where according to the arabic-latin translation it is had thus: And if it is generated, it is necessary, that (its) "being" have a "that out of which it is generated", a "that which is generated out of it", and "a that through which it is generated". According to the Parisian edition (Firmin-Didot), Bk. III, ch. 5: If it is made, it is necessary that there is, a "out of which it is made", and a "from which there is generated".

4 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, texts 34-50 (ch. 4), where he deals with nutrition and generation. — Near the end of the argument at *one* [una] the Vatican edition less well omits *entirely* [omnino] and after *the same* [idem] it omits *is* [est], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.

5 Under this respect Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 34 (ch. 4), defining the act of generating of a living (thing) says: it is a "to make a such as itself". Concerning the term of action Aristotle says, Metaphysics, Bk. I, ch. 1: Moreover actions and generations are all about a singular (thing). — At the end of the argument some codices, such as A I and T, together with edition 1 read *is terminated* [terminatur] in place of *will be terminated* [terminabitur].

6 See Aristotle, On Predicaments, ch. "On Substance".

7 The codices omit the *however* [vero] added by the Vatican edition here after *as much as*, in place of which to the word *as much as* [quantum] very many codices, such as A F G I K S T V X and Z, which we follow, preface the particle *and* [et], others, such as H P Q and Y, have *but* [sed]. A little below this trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged *this* [haec] after *because* [quia].

8 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 28 (Bk. VI, ch. 8).

9 The book On the Person and the two Natures. ch. 3 at the beginning (Migne's edition). — Immediately after this the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *But because* [Sed quia] in place of *And since* [Et quoaniam]. — Concerning the term of generation cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 26 ff (Bk. VI, ch. 8).

10 Trusting the manuscripts we have expunged the *down from* [de] added by the Vatican edition.

11 That is, in an individual or a supposit. Concerning which cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, loc. cit.. — The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts as *as in this* [ut in hoc].

12 The Vatican edition incongruously and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 adds *for that reason in concretion* [ideo in concretione].

---

p. 118

SCHOLION.

I. Haec conclusio est iterum contra abbatem Ioachim (cfr. Schol. hic a. 4. q. 1.). Ut recte intelligatur conclusio, notandum, quod non

SCHOLIUM

I. Again, this conclusion is against Abbot Joachim (cf. the Scholium, here at a. 4, q. 1). To understand the conclusion rightly, it

est sermo de *subiecto* generationis, quod in generatione creaturarum est materia prima, quae praesupponitur generationi, sed de *termino* generationis, qui incipit esse.

must be noted, that it is not a discourse concerning the *subject* of generation, which in the generation of creatures is the prime matter, which is presupposed to generation, but rather concerning the *terminus* of generation, which begins to be.

Perfecta generatio terminatur ad substantiam, non ad accidens; sed S. Doctor cum communi sententia distinguit duplicem substantiam: altera dicitur substantia *prima*, quae est *omne individuum* in genere substantiae; altera vero *secunda*, quae est aliquid « commune » in genere substantiae. Substantia prima est terminus totalis generationis quantum ad *productionem*; substantia vero secunda est terminus formalis (at partialis) quantum ad *intentionem*. In creaturis uterque terminus incipit esse de novo, non vero in Deo. « Unde generatio divina terminatur ad primam substantiam, non ad essentiam, neque ad relatione, in quantum est *relatio*, sed in quantum est persona subsistens. ». Ita hic Richard. a Med.

Perfect generation is terminated at a substance, not at an accident; but the Seraphic Doctor with the common sentence distinguished a twofold substance: one of the two is called the *first* substance, which is *every individual* in the genus of substance; but the other of the two is the *second* (substance), which is anything « common » in the genus of substance. The first substance is the total terminus of the generation as much as regards *production*; but the second substance is the formal (but partial) terminus as much as regards *intention*. Among creatures each term begins to be from (something) new, but not (so) in God. « Whence divine generation is terminated at the first substance, not at an essence, nor at a relation, inasmuch as it is a *relation*, but rather as much as it is a subsistent Person ». Thus Richard of Middleton on this distinction.

II. In conclusione et principalibus argumentis doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 1; p. IV. q. 10. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3; S. I. q. 39. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. secundae quaest. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 59. q. 1. n. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

II. In the conclusion and the principle arguments the doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 3; Summa., I, q. 39, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in the 1st princ. of q. 2, second quaest.. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 118-119.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

ARTICLE II

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 118-119.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum substantia sive essentia divina per generationem communicetur.

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum substantia per generationem communicetur; et quod sic, ostenditur[1] hoc modo.

1. Per illud res communicatur, per quod fit, ut sit in pluribus; sed substantia est in pluribus personis et non est nisi per generationem et per processionem: ergo per generationem communicatur.

2. Item, causa est, qua posita ponitur res et qua remota removetur;[2] sed posita emanatione in divinis, ponitur communitas et distinctio; remota generatione vel emanatione, essentia est in uno solo, sicut hypostasis: ergo generatio est ratio communicandi essentiam.

3. Item, quod datur alicui et non desinit haberi a dante, per illud[3] per quod datur, per illud communicatur; sed substantia a Patre datur Filio per generationem et non desinit haberi a Patre, dum datur Filio: ergo per generationem communicatur.

QUESTION II

Whether the Substance or Divine Essence is communicated through generation.

Lastly it is asked, whether the Substance is communicated through generation; and that (this is) so, is shown[1] in this manner.

1. A thing is communicated through that, through which it comes to be [fit], so that it may be among more [in pluribus]; but the Substance is in more Persons and is not (there) but through generation and through procession: therefore through generation It is communicated.

2. Likewise, a cause is (that), which when posited a thing is posited and which when removed (a thing) is removed;[2] but with emanation posited among the divine, there is posited a community and a distinction; with generation and/or emanation removed, the Essence is in One alone, just as a Hypostasis (is): therefore generation is a reason for communicating the Essence.

3. Likewise, what is given to someone and does not cease to be had by the one giving, through that[3] through which it is given, through that it is communicated; but the Substance is given by the Father to the Son through generation and does not cease to be had by the Father, while It is given to the Son: therefore through generation It is

communicated.

4. Item, generatio in his inferioribus est ratio communicandi substantiam sive naturam; sed in divinis natura est illis multo communicabilior,[4] quia simplicior: ergo in divinis per generationem substantia vel essentia communicatur.

4. Likewise, generation among these lesser (things) is the reason for communicating a substance or nature; but among the divine the Nature is much more communicable than these (are),[4] because (It is) simpler: therefore among the divine the Substance and/or Essence is communicated through generation.

Contra: 1. Generatio est principium distinguendi;[5] sed non est idem principium distinguendi et communicandi: ergo per generationem non est ratio communicandi in divinis: ergo per generationem nihil communicatur.

On the contrary: 1. Generation is a principle of distinguishing;[5] but the principle of distinguishing and of communicating is not the same: therefore through generation there is not a reason for communicating among the divine: therefore through generation nothing is communicated.

2. Item, quod facit aliquid esse *in hoc*, non est ratio communicandi, sed appropriandi et individuandi; sed generatio facit esse substantiam in tali persona, utpote in persona Filii: ergo non est ratio communicandi, sed appropriandi.

2. Likewise, what makes something to be *in this one*, is not a reason for communicating, but for appropriating and individuating; but generation makes the Substance to be in such a Person, as [utpote] in the Person of the Son: therefore it is not a reason for communicating, but for appropriating.

3. Item, omne illud quod per generationem communicatur, per generationem est commune.[6] Si ergo substantia per generationem communicatur, generatione circumscripta, non erit communis: ergo propria; sed proprium per generationem non potest communicari: ergo nec substantia.

3. Likewise, every 'that' which is communicated through generation, is common through generation.[6] If, therefore, the Substance is communicated through generation, with generation excluded [circumscripta], It will not be common: therefore (It will be) proper; but the proper cannot be communicated through generation: therefore neither (can) the Substance.

4. Item, quod per generationem communicatur, per generationem datur et recipitur, et omne tale, si non est generationi accidentale, generatur; sed substantia non accidit generationi: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, what is communicated through generation, through generation is given and received, and everything such, if it is not accidental to generation, is generated; but the Substance is not an accident [accidit] to generation: therefore etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Essentia divina per generationem communicatur, quia per generationem fit, ut sit in pluribus una.

CONCLUSION

The Divine Essence is communicated through generation, because through generation it comes to be, so as to be the One among More.

Respondeo: Ad hoc intelligendum notandum est, quod *commune*, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad actum et potentiam. Commune enim potest dici illud quod est *communicabile*, quamvis non sit in pluribus; sicut patet in multis universalibus, ut in sole et luna et

I respond: For this to be understood it must be noted, that "the *common*", as much as it is from itself, holds itself indifferently toward act and potency. For "the common" can be said (to be) that which is "the *communicable*", even though [quamvis] it be not in the more; just as is

huiusmodi. Commune etiam dicitur *communicatum*, quod est actu in pluribus.

clear in many universals, as in the Sun and the Moon and (things) of this kind. "The common" is also said (to be) "the *communicated*", because it is by an act in the more.

Dico ergo, quod quemadmodum forma universalis, quantum est de se, est communicabilis; sed tamen actu communicatur per propagationem[7] plu- / -rium, . . .

Therefore I say, that to the extent that [quemadmodum] a form (is) a universal, as much as it is from itself, it is communicable; but, nevertheless [tamen], it is communicated by an act through the propagation[7] of the / more,

[1] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1 *videtur*.
[2] Aristot., II. Phys. text. 37 (c. 3.): Operantes quidem (causae) et singulares simul sunt et non sunt cum iis, quorum sunt causae. Cfr. S. Thom., Comment. in hunc locum.
[3] Substituimus ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 *illud* pro *idem*.
[4] Sensus est: natura est multo communicabilior quam in illis inferioribus. — Forte melius cum cod. T omiteretur *illis*.
[5] Cfr. supra d. 4. q. 2. obiect. 4. — Mox post primum *ergo* Vat. planius quidem *generatio* loco *per generationem*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
[6] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1: *Item per generationem communicatur omne illud quod per generationem est commune*, et paulo infra post *communicatur* addit: *per generationem est communis. Si ergo substantia per generationem communicatur*, qua transpositione et edditione vis argumenti debilitatur.
[7] Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. et cod. cc *actu non communicatur nisi per propagationem*. Vat. deinde contra mss. et ed. 1 addit *vel aggregatoinem*; sed aperte falsum. Paulo infra plerique codd. ut A F G K T etc. cum ed. 1 *communicatur* pro *communicetur*.

[1] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has *it seems* [videtur].
[2] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 37 (ch. 3): Indeed working and singular (causes) simultaneously are and are not with those, of which they are the causes. Cf. St. Thomas, Commentary on this passage.
[3] We have substituted from many of the manuscripts and edition 1 *that* [illud] in place of *the same* [idem].
[4] The sense is: nature is much more simpler than (it is) in those inferior (beings). — Perhaps it would be better to omit with codex T *than they (are)* [illis].
[5] Cf. above d. 4, q. 2, objection 1. — Then after the first *therefore* [ergo] the Vatican edition indeed more plainly has *generation* [generatio] in place of *through generation there* [per generationem], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
[6] The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1: *Likewise through generation there is communicated every "that" which is common through generation* [*Item per generationem communicatur omne illud quod per generationem est commune*], and a little below this after *is communicated through generation* [communicatur] it adds: *through generation It is common. If, therefore, the Substance is communicated through generation* [*per generationem est communis. Si ergo substantia per generationem communicatur*], by which transposition and addition the force of the argument is weakened.
[7] Thus the more ancient codices together with edition 1, while the Vatican edition and codex cc has *it is not communicated by an act except through propagation* [actu non communicator nisi per propagationem]. Then the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 adds *and/or aggregation* [vel aggregationem]; but this is clearly false. A little below this very many codices, such as A F G K T etc., together with edition 1 have the indicative rather than the subjunctive for *is communicated* [communicetur].

p. 119

plu- / -rium, sic natura divina vel essentia de se quidem communicabilis est, sed quod actu communicetur, non est nisi per illud quod multiplicat vel plurificat ei supposita;

of the / more, so the Divine Nature and/or Essence is from itself indeed communicable, but because It is communicated by an act, It is not except through that which multiplies

haec autem est generatio.[1]

and/or plurifies Its supposits; but this is generation.[1]

Quoniam igitur per generationem personae plurificantur, et substantia in illis non numeratur, hinc est, quod verissime substantia vel essentia per generationem communicatur, quia per generationem fit, ut sit una in pluribus.

Therefore since through generation the Persons are plurified, and the Substance is not numbered among Them, hence it is, that most truly is the Substance and/or Essence communicated through generation, because through generation it comes, to be the One in the More.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio est principium distinguendi; dicendum, quod generatio per se est principium distinguendi suppositum a supposito, quia ad illud terminatur per se; etiam est principium communicandi naturam[2] communem, quia similem ex simili. Sed quoniam natura in inferioribus numeratur in suppositis, ideo est principium distinguendi etiam commune, sed per accidens; in Deo autem nec est per se nec per accidens.

1. To that which is objected, that generation is a principle of distinguishing; it must be said, that generation per se is a principle for distinguishing a supposit from a supposit, because per se (generation) is terminated at that; it is also a principle for communicating a common nature[2], because (it makes) a similar from a similar. But since nature in inferiors is numbered in supposits, for that reason it is a principle for distinguishing even (what is) common, but per accidens; but in God (generation) is neither per se nor per accidens.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facere commune esse in hoc est ratio appropriandi; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando commune est appropriabile vel appropriatum per *esse in hoc*. Divina autem essentia non est sic appropriabilis, vel appropriata per *esse in hoc*, quia non est appropriabilis quoad significatum nec quoad suppositum, quia idem significat et supponit, sicut supra ostensum est;[3] significatum autem eius nulla additione distinguitur. Haec enim est vera: essentia Patris et essentia, quae est in Patre, est Filius.

2. To that which is objected, that 'to make the common to be in this' is a reason for appropriating; it must be said, that that has (its) truth, when the common is appropriable and/or appropriated through the '*to be in this*'. But the Divine Essence is not thus appropriable, and/or appropriated through the '*to be in this*', because it is not appropriable in regard to the signified nor in regard to the Supposit, because it signifies and supposes the Same, just as has been shown above;[3] but its signified is distinguished by no addition. For this is true: "the Essence of the Father and the Essence, which is in the Father, is the Son".

Vel aliter potest dici, quod facere *esse in hoc* est dupliciter: aut *absolute*; et sic est ratio appropriandi; aut *in comparatione*, ut illud quod erat prius in uno, fiat postea in alio; et sic est ratio communicandi naturam. Sed quaedam natura est, quae distinguitur[4] in suppositis, ut puta illa cui fit additio, quaedam non, ut divina; et in prima est ratio communicandi et distinguendi, in divina solum communicandi.

And/or it can otherwise be said, that 'to cause (something) *to be in this*' is in a twofold manner: either *absolutely*; and thus it is a reason for appropriating; or *in comparison*, as that which was first in one, afterwards comes to be [fit] in another; and thus it is a reason for communicating a nature. But there is a certain nature, which is distinguished[4] in supposits, as for example [ut puta] that (nature) to which an addition is made, (and there is) a certain one (that is) not, as in the Divine (Nature);

and in the first there is a reason for communicating and of distinguishing, in the Divine solely (a reason) for communicating.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si per generationem communicatur, generatio substantiam facit communem;[5] dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod commune dicitur *secundum actum*, quia in pluribus, sed non *secundum potentiam*. Unde circumscripta generatione, substantia est communis, quia *communicabilis*; sed non est communis, quia *communicata*.

3. To that which is objected, that if it is communicated through generation, generation makes the Substance to be common;[5] it must be said, that it is true, according to which "the common" is said (to be) *according to an act*, because (it is) in the more, but not *according to potency*. Whence with generation excluded, the Substance is common, because (it is) communicable; but It is not common, because (it is) *communicated*.

4. Ad ilud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod per generationem datur, generatur; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia *generari* dicit productionem et distinctionem, sed *datio*[6] dicit auctoritatem et communicationem; et quoniam per generationem substantia non distinguitur, quamvis communicetur: ergo etc.

4. To that which is objected, that that which is given through generation, is generated; it must be said, that it is false: because '*to be generated*' means (that there is) a production and a distinction, but a '*being given*' [datio] means (that there is) an authorship and communication; and since through generation the Substance is not distinguished, though It is communicated: ergo etc..

SCHOLION.

I. Scot. (hic. q. 2.) observat, quod aliud est aliquid per generationem *communicare*, aliud per eandem aliquid *producere*: productio enim infert realem distinctionem inter producentem et productum, non vero communicatio. Essentia igitur divina nec generatur nec producitur nec multiplicatur, tamen secundum omnes theologos *communicatur*. Terminus totalis generationis in Deo est Filius, et relatio inter generantem et generatum est realis cum reali distinctione. Sed inter communicantem et communicatum, quod est essentia divina, non est realis relatio, nec alia distinctio nisi secundum rationem. Cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. in corp. et ad 2; et d. 34. q. 2. ad 7, et ibid. q. 1.

II. Inter antiquos Scholasticos non invenimus, qui explicite hanc quaestionem tractent, praeter B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 1. n. 57 et seqq. — Petr. Aureolum, hic q. 5. — Eam tangit

SCHOLIUM

I. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (here in q. 2) observes, that it is one thing '*to communicate* something through generation', another '*to produce* something' through the same: for production introduces [infert] a real distinction between the one producing and the product, however communication (does) not. Therefore the Divine Essence is neither generated nor produced nor multiplied, however according to all theologians *it is communicated*. The terminus of the whole generation in God is the Son, and the relation between the One generating and the One generated is real with a real distinction. But between the One communicating and the One communicated, because (each) is the Divine Essence, there is not a real relation, nor any distinction except according to reckoning. Cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2, in body, and at n. 2; and d. 34, q. 2, at n. 7, and ibid., q. 1.

II. Among the ancient Scholastics we have not found any who explicitly treat of this question, except Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 60, q. 1, n. 57 ff.. — Peter

Scot., hic q. 2.

Aureolus, here in q. 5. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus touches upon it, here in q. 2.

[1] Cod. O addit *et processio*.
[2] Ex antiquioribus mss. adiecimus *etiam*, sicut et paulo infra fide mss. et ed. 1 *similem* substituimus loco *consimilem*.
[3] Hic a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.
[4] Vat. *dividitur*, sed absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1. Paulo post cod. I *quaedam quae non distinguitur* loco *quaedam non*, et mox cod. W post *solum* repetit *ratio*.
[5] Ita multi codd. ut C L O S V W X Y etc. cum ed. 1; alii vero ut A F G H I T Z etc. *quod si generatio communicat substantiam, facit communem*. Vat. *communicatur substantia, fit per generationem communis substantia*.
[6] Mendum Vat. *ratio* pro *datio* ex mss. correximus et paulo infra fide codd. B D F H I P Q T Y loco *quia* substituimus *et quoniam*, licet alii antiqui codd. ut A E G K S W X Z ee ff cum ed. 1 colum habeant *quoniam*, sed minus bene.

[1] Codex O adds *and procession* [et processio].
[2] From the more ancient manuscripts we have inserted *also* [etiam], just as also a little below this, trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *similar* [similem] in place of *an exactly-similar* [consimilem].
[3] Here in a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2.
[4] The Vatican edition has *is divided* [dividitur], but without the authority of any manuscript or edition 1. A little after this codex I has *a certain one which is not distinguished* [quaedam quae non distinguitur] in place of *a certain one (that does) not* [quaedam non], and then codex W after *solely* [solum] repeats *a reason* [ratio].
[5] Thus many codices, such as C L O S V W X Y etc., together with edition 1; but others, such as A F G H I T Z etc., read *that if generation communicates a substance, it makes (it) common* [quod si generation communicat substantiam, facit communem]. The Vatican edition has *is communicated as a substance, there comes to be through generation a common substance* [communicator substantia, fit per generationem communis substantia].
[6] The faulty reading of the Vatican edition, *reason* [ratio] for *a being given* [datio], we have corrected from the manuscripts and a little below this, trusting in codices B D F H I P Q T and Y, we have substituted *and since* [et quoniam] in place of *because* [quia], though other ancient codices, such as A E G K S W X Z ee and ff, together with edition 1 have solely *since* [quoniam], but less well.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 119-123.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 119-123.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima dubitatio est de rationibus Magistri. Nam *prima* eius ratio ducit ad hoc inconveniens, scilicet quod, si essentia generaretur a Patre, essentia poneretur pro relativo; et haec ratio ponitur ibi: *Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam*. Sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens. Si enim magis convenit essentia cum supposito, quam universale cum singulari; si non est inconveniens, quod universale ponatur[7] pro singulari, nec est inconveniens, quod essentia ponatur pro relativo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si *essentia* poneretur pro relativo, esset inconveniens, non a parte / rei, . . .

[7] Vat. cum cod. cc *cum universale ponitur*, sed minus bene et contra alios codd., quorum tamen aliqui, retenta particula *quod*, legunt *ponitur* loco *ponatur*.

Doubt I

In that part of his (text) there occur [incidunt] doubts about the text, and the first doubt concerns Master (Peter's) reasons. For his *first* reason leads to this unfitting (conclusion), that is, that, if the Essence were generated by the Father, the Essence would be posited for a relative; and this reason is posited there (where he says): *For that reason it must not be said, that the Father begot the Divine Essence*. But this seems (to be) nothing unfitting [inconveniens]. For if the Essence convenes more with a Supposit, than a universal (does) with a singular; if it is not unfitting, that a universal be posited[7] for a singular, neither is it unfitting, that the Essence be posited for a relative.

I respond: It must be said, that if the *Essence* were posited for a relative, it would be unfitting, not on the part / of the thing, . . .

[7] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *when a universal is posited* [cum universale ponitur], but less well and contrary to the other codices, some of which, however, having retained the particle *that* [quod], read *is posited* [ponitur] in place of *be posited* [ponatur].

p. 120

rei, sed a parte expressionis fidei. Tunc enim videretur et[1] notaretur unitas essentiae in quadam distinctione. Esset etiam inconveniens, quia quod ponitur pro relativo in quantum huius modi, non indicat essentiam. Si ergo[2] essentia poneretur pro relativo, essentia aliquando non indicaret essentiam, quod est omni rationi contrarium.

of the thing, but on the part of the expression of the Faith. For then there would seem (to be) and[1] to be denoted the Unity of the Essence in a certain distinction. It would also be unfitting [inconveniens], because what is posited for a relative inasmuch as (it is) of this kind, does not indicate an essence. Therefore[2] if the Essence would be posited for a relative, the Essence would sometimes not indicate the Essence, which is contrary to every reckoning.

Dub. II.

Doubt II

Item secundo dubitatur de *secunda* ratione, in qua ducit ad hoc inconveniens, quod eadem res gigneret se ipsam, et ponitur, ibi: *Item cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius quod ipse est*, quia *essentia* dicit quid commune, sicut et hoc nomen *Deus*; sed si dicatur: homo[3] Petrus generat hominem, et ipse est homo: ergo generat se, argumentum istud nihil valet. Similiter videtur hic: Pater generat Deum: ergo etc., pari ratione nec in proposito.

Likewise, second, there is a doubt [dubitatur] concerning (his) *second* reason, in which he leads (the reader) to this unfitting (conclusion), that the same thing would beget its very self, and (this) is posited, there (where he says): *Likewise since God the Father is the Divine Essence, if He were its begetter, He would certainly* [utique] *be the begetter of that which He Himself is*, because "the *Essence*" means what (is) common, just as this noun "*God*" (does); but if there be said: "the man[3] Peter generates a man and he himself is the man: therefore he generates himself", that argument of his is worth [valet] nothing. Similarly does it seem here: "the Father generates God: therefore etc.", for an equal reason neither (is it valid) in the proposed.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *commune* dicitur quod est in multis; sed hoc potest esse *tripliciter*: *aut* quod plurificatur in multis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad suppositum, ut hoc nomen *homo*; et tale habet unitatem rationis, quae admittit distinctionem et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum.[4] Unde bene dicitur homo esse ab homine, et: duos esse homines. *Alio* modo est *commune* quod plurificatur quantum ad suppositum, non quantum ad formam, ut hoc nomen *Deus*; et tale habet unitatem rei, secundum quod res nominat naturam cum multiplicatione suppositorum: et ideo recipit distinctivum,[5] quod importat distinctionem ut modum, non ut rem. Unde conceditur: Deus de Deo, sed non: Deus est alius a Deo. Est *tertio* modo *commune* secundum nomen, quod est in multis, nec tamen plurificatur quantum ad *formam*, quia est unum in multis, nec quantum ad *supposita*, quia pro illis non supponit, ut hoc nomen *essentia*. De tali communi verum est dicere, quod non recipit distinctionem nec quantum ad modum, nec quantum ad rem; tunc enim notaretur idem distingui a se. Et ita argumentum Magistri est bonum: si Pater genuit essentiam, Pater genuit se; et[6] loquitur de communi a parte vocis significantis, non a parte rei, quia a parte rei eadem communitas est in hoc quod est *Deus* et in hoc quod est *essentia*.

I **respond**: It must be said, that "the *common*" is said (to be that) which it is in many; but this can be *in a threefold manner*: *either* because it is plurified in many, both as much as regards form and as much as regards supposit, as this noun "*man*" (is); and such has a unity of reckoning, which admits a distinction both as much as regards thing and as much as regards the manner (of being regarded).[4] Whence a man is rightly said "to be from a man", and: (it is rightly said) "that there are two men". In *another* manner (something) is "*common*" because it is plurified as much as regards supposit, not as much as regards form, as this noun "*God*" (is); and such has a unity of thing, according to which the "thing" names "a nature with a multiplication of supposits": and for that reason it receives (something) distinctive,[5] which conveys a distinction as a manner (of being regarded), not as a thing. Whence there is conceded: "God from God", but not: "God is an Other than God". In a *third* manner (something) is "*common*" according to (its) name, which is in many (things), and yet it is not plurified as much as regards *form*, because it is "the one in the many", nor as much as regards (its) *supposits*, because it does not suppose on their behalf, as this noun "*essence*" (does). Of such a common (thing) it is true to say, that it does not receive distinction neither as much as regards a manner (of being regarded), nor as much as regards thing; for

then there would be noted that the same is distinguished by the itself. And thus the argument of Master (Peter) is a good one: "if the Father begot the Essence, the Father begot Himself"; and[6] he speaks of the common on the part of the signifying word [vocis], not on the part of the thing, because on the part of the Thing the same commonality [communitas] is in This because It is "*God*" and in This because It is the "*Essence*".

Dub. III.

Item tertio obiicitur contra *tertiam* rationem: si Pater genuit divinam essentiam, tunc genitum gignenti causa est, ut sit et Deus sit, et ponitur ibi: *Et si ita est, non genito gignens* etc. Sed haec ratio nihil videtur valere, quia ratio causae non cadit in divinis; « causa enim est cuius esse sequitur aliud »;[7] sed in divinis non est aliud: ergo etc.

Item, non sequitur: Pater genuit sapientiam: ergo est sapiens sapientia genita: ergo pari ratione nec praedicta locutio[8] valet.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sumendo nomen causae proprie, non cadit in divinis,[9] cadit tamen et recipitur ratio principiantis et ratio informantis, et pro his accipitur nomen causae. Quoniam igitur ratio essendi significatur per hoc nomen *essentia*: ideo essentia significat[10] quodam modo in ratione causae respectu entis. Si ergo essentia esset genita ab ente, significaretur in ratione effectus sive principiati, et idem esset tunc principium et principiatum respectu eiusdem, quod est impossibile; et in hoc fundatur ratio Magistri.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia; dicendum, quod tactum est de ipsa in quaestionibus extra litteram,[11] quia nomen

Doubt III

Likewise, third, there is the objection [obiicitur] against (his) *third* reason: if the Father begot the Divine Essence, then the Begotten is the cause for the One Begetting, to be and to be God, and (this) is posited there (where he says): *And if He is thus, the one begetting (is) not the cause* etc.. But this reason seems to be worth nothing, because the reckoning of cause does not occur among the divine; « for a cause belongs to that which the other "being" follows »;[7] but among the divine there is not another ("being"): ergo etc..

Likewise, (this) does not follow: "the Father begot Wisdom: therefore He is wise by the Wisdom begotten": therefore for an equal reason neither is the aforesaid saying[8] valid.

I respond: It must be said, that, taking the name for a cause in a proper (sense), it does not occur among the divine,[9] nevertheless [tamen] there does occur and there is received a reckoning of one beginning [principiantis] and a reckoning of one informing, and for these there is accepted the name of "cause". Therefore since a reckoning of being [essendi] is signified through this name "*essence*": for that reason "essence" signifies[10] in a certain manner in the reckoning of a cause in respect of a being [entis]. Therefore if the Essence were begotten by a Being, It would signify in the reckoning of the effect or of One begun, and the Same would then be beginning and the begun in respect of the Same, which is impossible; and upon this (recognition) is founded (that) reason of Master (Peter).

To that which is objected concerning Wisdom; it must be said, that this has been touched upon in questions outside of the

ita abstractum, sicut *essentia*, non supponit pro relativo, *sapientia* bene supponit pro relativo; et ita est ibi accidens: Pater est sapiens sapientia et genuit sapientiam: ergo est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, vel sapientia genita. In nomine autem *essentiae* non est accidens, quoniam idem significat et supponit.

text,[11] because a name so abstract, as "*essence*" (is), does not suppose on behalf of a relative, (and) *wisdom* does suppose well on behalf of a relative; and thus there is a (fallacy of the) accident there (when it is argued): "the Father is wise by Wisdom and He begot Wisdom: therefore He is wise by the Wisdom which He begot, and/or by the begotten Wisdom". But in the name for an *essence* there is not an accident, since it signifies and supposes the same (thing).

---

[1] Ed. 1 *quod* loco *et*; aliqui codd. ut G U dd *connotaretur* pro *notaretur*.
[2] Meliorem lectionem damus ex mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *ergo* pro *enim*.
[3] Vat. *hoc modo* pro *homo*, sed castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. Paulo infra Vat. contra multos codd. ut A C F G H I S T W etc. *illud non* loco *istud nihil*.
[4] Supple: se habendi. Vide supra d. 4. dub. 1. — Paulo post aliquid codd. ut A B D F G H K etc. cum Vat. ponunt *homo est ab homine*. — De *communi* in Deo et creturis cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2; d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 2.
[5] Cod. T bene addit *secundum*; nonnulli codd. ut F G H K ee ff *distinctionem* loco *distinctivum*, in qua lectione *quod* cum cod. H sumendum esset pro *quia*. Paulo infra mss. cum ed. 1 *Deus esse alius* pro *Deus est alius*; cod. O. post *a Deo* addit *vel duo dii*.
[6] Vat. praeter fiem mss. et ed. 1 *quia* loco *et*.
[7] In hac communiter recepta causae definitione, quae ex Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28-38. (c. 3.), II. Metaph. text. 6. seq. (I. brevior. c. 2), V. Metaph. text. 2-4. (IV. c. 2.) colligi potest, Vat. hic et alibi contra codd. ac ed. 1 relativo *cuius* praefigit praepositionem *ad*.
[8] Substituimus ex aniquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *locutio* pro *solutio*.
[9] Cfr. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo ante cod. K post *causae* addit *de se*.
[10] Vat. contra multos codd. ut A C F G H K L O S T U Y etc. et ed. 1 modo passivo *signatur*.
[11] Hic q. 1. — Plura de ista propositione: sapiens sapientia genita, vide d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. ac 2. — Paulo infra ex cod. W adiecimus *sapientia bene supponit pro relativo*, quod certe supplendum et in aliis mss. forte omissum est propter huius et praecedentis propositionis communem desinentiam *pro relativo*; et mox ex eodem cod. W. addidimus *ibi*.

[1] Edition 1 reads *it would seem that there would be* [videretur quod]; other codices as G U and dd have *connoted* [connotaretur] in place of *noted* [notaretur].
[2] We give the better reading of the manuscripts and edition 1, which put *therefore* [ergo] in place of *for* [enim].
[3] The Vatican edition has *in this manner* [hoc modo] in place of *man* [homo], this has been corrected from the manuscripts and the six first editions. A little below this the Vatican edition, contrary to many codices, such as A C F G H I S T W etc., has *that . . . not* [illud non] in place of *that . . . of his . . . nothing* [istud nihil].
[4] Supply: "of being regarded" [se habendi]. See above d. 4, doubt 1. — A little after this some codices, such as A B D F G H K etc., together with the Vatican edition have *"a man is by a man"* [homo est ab homine]. Concerning what is *common* in God and creatures, cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2; d. 23, a. 1, q. 3 and a. 2, q. 2.
[5] Codex T adds *according to* [secundum] well enough; not a few codices as F G H K ee and ff have *distinction* [distinctionem] in place of *(something) distinctive* [distinctivum], in which reading quod [trans. here as *which*] with codex H must be taken as *that* [quia: here the Quaracchi editors understand *distinctive* apparently as *(distinctive supposit)*]. A little below this the manuscripts together with edition 1 read *God to be an Other* [Deus esse alius in place of *"God is an Other"* [Deus est alius]; codex O after *than God* [a Deo] adds *and/or (is) two gods*.
[6] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has *because* [quia] in place of *and* [et].
[7] In this commonly received definition of a cause, which can be gathered from Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 28-38 (ch. 3), Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 6 ff. (Bk. I, of the shorter version, ch. 2), Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 2-4 (Bk. IV, ch. 2), the Vatican edition here and elsewhere, contrary to the codices and edition 1, has *regards the "being" of that which* [est ad cuius].
[8] We have substituted from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 *saying* [locutio] in place of *solution* [solutio].
[9] Cf. d. 29, a. 1, q. 1. — A little before this codex K after *for a cause* [causae] adds *of itself* [de se].
[10] The Vatican edition, contrary to many codices, such as A C F G H K L O S T U Y etc., and edition 1 has the passive mood *is signified* [signatur].
[11] Here in q. 1. — For more on this proposition of

his: “wise by the begotten Wisdom” [sapiens sapientia genita], see d. 32, a. 2, q. 1 and dubium 1 and 2. — A little below this from codex W we have inserted *wisdom does suppose well on behalf of a relative*, which certainly must be supplied and perhaps was omitted in the other manuscripts on account of the similar ending [communem desinentiam] of this and the preceding proposition *on behalf of a relative* [pro relativo]; and then from the same codex W we have added *there* [ibi].

---

p. 121

Dub. IV.

Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium. Contra hoc obiicit Ioachim, tam contra *positionem* quam contra *rationem*. Contra *positionem*, quia si essentia non generat nec generatur nec procedit: ergo in divinis est res generans et genita et procedens, et res nec generans nec genita nec procedens; et ita est ibi[1] quaternitas, si sunt quatuor res.

Item irridet *rationem* Magistri: si essentia generat essentiam, et essentia est una res: ergo una res generat se ipsam. Similiter, inquit Ioachim, potuisiti dicere, Petre: Deus generat Deum, et[2] unus est Deus: ergo eadem res generat se ipsam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Ioachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia res non accipitur uniformiter, quia cum dicitur res primo modo, ibi accipitur res pro *re naturae*; sed cum dicitur[3] secundo modo, accipitur pro *ipsa natura* divina. *Praeterea*, deficit ab insufficienti, quia non valet: si aliquid dicitur de aliquo,[4] et non dicitur de alio, quod propter hoc illa faciant numerum. Unde non valet: Petrus est individuum: homo non est individuum: ergo Petrus et homo sunt duo. Habere enim proprietatem et non habere non sufficit ad distinguendum.

Ad *instantiam* eius dicendum, quod non

Doubt IV

Thus there also must not be said, that the Divine Essence begot the Son. Against this (Abbot) Joachim (of Fiore) objects, both against the *position* and against the *reckoning*. Against the *position*, because if the Essence does not generate nor is generated nor proceeds: therefore among the divine there is a Thing generating and begotten and proceeding, and a Thing not generating nor begotten nor proceeding; and thus there is There[1] a quaternity, (as) if there are four things.

Likewise he mocks Master (Peter's) *reckoning*: ‘if the Essence generates an essence, and the Essence is one thing: therefore one Thing generates Its very self’. Similarly, (Abbot) Joachim says, « You could have said, Peter: “God generates God, and[2] there is one God: therefore the same Thing generates Its very self.” »

I respond: It must be said, that (Abbot) Joachim does not argue rightly, and his reckoning is deficient [deficit], because “thing” [res] is not accepted uniformly, because when “thing” is said in the first manner, there “thing” is accepted for “*a thing of nature*” [re naturae]; but when it is said[3] in the second manner, it is accepted for the Divine *Nature Itself*. *Moreover*, it is deficient by an insufficient (reckoning), because it is not valid (to argue thus): ‘if anything is said of something,[4] and is not said of an other, that on this account they make a number’. Whence it is not valid (to argue thus): ‘Peter is an individual: man is not an individual: therefore Peter and man are two (things)’. For to have a property and not have (one) does not suffice to distinguish (two things).

Regarding his *opposing argument*

recte instat; quia *essentia* est res una quantum ad suppositum et significatum; non enim supponit personas; sed *Deus* est res una quantum ad significatum, sed plures quantum ad suppositum. Et ideo ignoranter Ioachim reprehendit Magistrum, et quia,[5] cum esset simplex, non est reveritus Magistrum, ideo iusto Dei iudicio damnatus fuit libellus eius in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magistri approbata.[6]

[instantiam] it must be said, that he does not rightly argue against it [instat]; because *the Essence* is one thing as much as regards supposit and signified; for it does not suppose the Persons; but "*God*" is one thing as much as regards signified, but more as much as regards supposit. And for that reason (Abbot) Joachim reprehends Master (Peter) in an ignorant manner, and because,[5] since he was a simpleton [simplex], he did not revere Master (Peter), for that reason by the just judgment of God his work [libellus] was condemned in the (Fourth) Lateran Council, and the position of Master (Peter) approved.[6]

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: *Nihil habet Filius, nisi quod nascendo accepit*. Quaeritur ergo de hoc verbo *accepit*, utrum dicat *substantiam* vel *relationem*. Si *substantiam*: ergo Pater similiter accepit; si *relationem*: ergo[7] cum essentiam acceperit Filius, essentia est accepta: ergo essentia refertur.

Doubt V

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) says: *The Son has nothing, but what He has accepted by being born*. Therefore there is asked concerning this word "*He has accepted*", whether it means "(He accepted) *a substance*" and/or "*a relation*". If *a substance*: therefore the Father similarly accepted; if *a relation*: therefore[7] since the Son accepted the Essence, the Essence is accepted: therefore the Essence is referred.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *accipere* dicit duo, scilicet *habere* et *esse* ab alio; quantum ad *habere* respicit essentiam; sed quantum ad hoc quod est *esse* ab alio, respicit personam: unde per verbum *accipiendi* significatur, quod essentia habetur a persona, quae est ab alio.[8]

I respond: It must be said, that '*to accept*' means two (things), that is, '*to have'* and '*to be* by an other'; as much as regards '*to have'* it respects the Essence; as much as regards this which is '*to be* by another', it respects a Person: whence through the verb for *being accepted* [accipiendi] there is signified, that the Essence is had by a Person, who is from an Other.[8]

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Et ideo non refertur ad aliud, quod in uno subsistit ex uno*, quia videtur falsum; quoniam Filius subsistit a Patre, tamen refertur ad Spiritum sanctum.[9]

Doubt VI

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *And for that reason there is not referred to an other, what in One subsists out of One*, because it seems (to be) false; since the Son subsists by the Father, (but) however He is referred to the Holy Spirit.[9]

Respondeo: Hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: *uno* modo, quod Filius non habet respectum nisi ad unam *personam*; et hoc intelligitur in quantum Filius, quia in quantum spirans est, refertur ad alium; *vel* quod persona Filii non habet respectum nisi ad unam *naturam*; et hoc verum est, quia Filius non habet in se

I respond: This can be understood in a twofold manner: in *one* manner, that the Son does not have a looking-back [respectum] except to one *Person*; and this is understood inasmuch as the Son, because inasmuch as He is one spirating [spirans], is referred to an Other; *and/or* that the Person

nisi naturam Patris.

of the Son does not have a looking-back except to one *Nature*; and this is true, because the Son does not have (anything) in Himself except the Nature of the Father.

Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus*. In divinis enim non est prius nec posterius, et ita nec praecedere nec sequi. *Si tu dicas*, quod est secundum rationem intelligendi; hoc nihil est, quia Deus gignens nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum sequitur aliquid.[10]

Doubt VII

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *Even His own Nature, as I thus call (it), does the unalterable God follow*. For among the divine there is not a prior nor a posterior, and thus neither a 'to precede' nor a 'to follow'. *If you say*, that there is (such) according to a reckoning of understanding; this is nothing, because God begetting, neither according to thing, nor according to the intellect, follows anything.[10]

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hilarius improprie loquitur, et ideo addit determinationem: *ut ita dicam*; et tantum vult dicere *sequi*, quantum *inseparabiliter comitari*[11] et consociare et ab illo non recedere, et hoc patet per sequens.

I respond: It must be said, that (St.) Hilary speaks improperly, and for that reason He adds a determination: *as I thus call (it)*; and he wants to say "*to follow*" only as much, as (it means) "*to be inseparably accompanied*"[11] and "to thoroughly associate" [consociare] and "to not recede from him [illo]", and this is clear through (what) follows.

Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de auctoritatibus Augustini, primo de hoc quod dicit, quod *Deus semel genuit Filium*. Videtur enim male dicere *semel*, quia *semel* dicit vicissitudinem; sed in generatione aeterna nulla cadit vicissitudo: ergo etc.

Doubt VIII

Likewise is asked concerning the authorities of (St.) Augustine, first concerning this which he says, that *God once begot the Son*. For he seems badly to say *once* [semel], because *once* says (that there is) vicissitude; but in eternal generation vicissitude does not occur [non cadit]: ergo etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *semel* potest dicere *nunc* temporis, vel *nunc* aeternitatis. Et si dicat *nunc* temporis, cum tempus habeat diversa *nunc*,

I respond: It must be said, that "*once*" [semel] can mean the *now* of time, and/or the *now* of eternity. And if he means the *now* of time, since time has diverse *nows*,

---

[1] Vat. refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit *ibi* post *si sunt*.
[2] Restituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.
[3] Substituimus fide nonnullorum codd. V X Y et ed. 1 *dicitur* pro *accipitur*.
[4] Vat. minus bene et contra antiquos mss. ac ed. 1 *altero* pro *aliquo*.
[5] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic omittit *quia*, et paulo infra pro *ideo* ponit *et sic*.
[6] Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. Scholion.
[7] Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *ergo*, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.
[8] De eisdem Hilarii verbis cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q.

[1] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, transposes *There* [ibi] after *if there are* [si sunt].
[2] We have restores from the older manuscripts and edition 1 the particle *and* [et].
[3] We have substituted, on the testimony of not a few codices, V X and Y, and edition 1, *it is said* [dicitur] in place of *is is accepted* [accipitur].
[4] The Vatican edition less well and contrary to the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 has *the other* [altero] in place of *something* [aliquo].
[5] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, here omits *because* [quia], and a little below this in place of *for that reason* [ideo] it puts

42. m. 3. a. 1. ad 8.
[9] Fide mss. addidimus *sanctum*.
[10] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *aliud*, et paulo infra contra eosdem omittit *dicendum*.
[11] Vat. *communicare et consonare*; plurimi Codd. *communicari et consonari*. Haec autem verba in codd. ob abbreviatam scripturam saepe vel sunt dubiae lecitonis vel cum verbis in textum nostrum receptis confunduntur. Verbum *comitari* recepimus ex. ed. 1 et *consociare* ex cod. Z. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. *et per hoc patet sequens*, sed minus bene.

and so [et sic].
[6] See above a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium.
[7] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *therefore* [ergo], which the Vatican omits less well.
[8] Concerning these words of (St.) Hilary, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, at n. 8.
[9] Trusting in the manuscripts we have added *Holy* [sanctum].
[10] The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, has *an other* [aliud], and a little below this, contrary to the same, omits *It must be said* [dicendum].
[11] The Vatican edition has *to communicate and to harmonize* [communicare et consonare]; very many of the codices have *to be communicated and to harmonize* [communicari et consonare]. But these words, on account of having been written in an abbreviated form in the codices are often doubtful in reading and/or confounded with words received in our text. The verb *to be accompanied* [comitari] we have received from edition edition 1 and *to thoroughly associate* [consociare] from codex Z. Then the Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions has *and through this the following is clear* [et per hoc patet sequens], but less well.

---

p. 122

notat intercisionem; si autem *nunc* aeternitatis, et[1] illud *nunc* semper est et invariabile et unum, *semel* dicit omnimodam invariabilitatem, perfectionem et unitatem.

he notes a cut-off [intercisionem]; but if (he means) the *now* of eternity, and[1] that *now* always is both invariable and one, (then) "*once*" means an omnimodal invariability, perfection and unity.

DUB. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Filii caritatis suae*, utrum caritas accipiatur ibi *essentialiter*, aut *notionaliter*. Si *essentialiter*: ergo Christus Filius est essentiae, quod non conceditur. *Si tu dicas*, quod est impropria locutio, et est sensus: *Filii essentiae*, id est, qui est essentia; tunc nullus videtur sensus, et pro nihilo additum[2] hoc quod est *caritatis*. Et *rursus* Augustinus exponit, *Filii caritatis*, id est *Filii dilecti*; sed Pater diligit Filium Spiritu sancto: ergo etc. Si propter hoc *dicas*, quod tenetur *notionaliter*; tunc ergo Filius Dei est Filius Spiritus sancti, quod absurdum est omnino.

DOUBT IX

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *of the Son of His charity*, whether "charity" is accepted there *essentially*, or *notionally*. If *essentially*: therefore Christ is the Son of the Essence, which is not conceded. *If you say*, that the saying is improper, and the sense is: "*of the Son, the Essence*", that is, "of Him who is the Essence"; then it seems (to be) nonsense [nullus sensus], and for nothing (that there has) been added[2] this (word) which is "*of charity*". And *again* (St.) Augustine expounds, "*of the Son of (His) charity*", that is "*of (His) beloved Son*" [Filii dilecti]; but the Father loves [diligit] the Son by the Holy Spirit: ergo etc.. If on account of this *you say*, that it is held *notionally*; then the Son of God is therefore the Son of the Holy Spirit, which is entirely absurd.

Respondeo: Ad[3] hoc dicut aliqui, quod ille genitivus nec proprie essentialiter nec proprie notionaliter, sed medio modo tenetur, id est *appropriate*. Licet enim caritas sit omnibus communis et proprium Spiritus sancti, uno tamen modo appropriate convenit Patri, quia caritas est amor gratuitus; et sic dicit Richardus, quia amor gratuitus est, qui tantum dat et nihil accipit,[4] et hoc est in persona Patris, ideo appropriatur Patri. Alio modo dici potest, quod caritas ibi tenetur *essentialiter*, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod[5] nihil aliud est dicere *Filii caritatis* quam *Filii substantiae*; sed genetivus non construitur in ratione principii, sed ex vi declarationis essentiae,[6] et est sensus: *Filii caritatis* id est Filii cari; et *Filii substantiae* vel naturae, hoc est Filii consubstantialis et naturalis.

I respond: Regarding[3] this some say, that that genitive is held neither properly essentially nor properly notionally, but in a middle manner, that is *appropriately*. For though charity be common to All and proper to the Holy Spirit, however in one manner it appropriately befits the Father, because charity is gratuitous Love [amor gratuitus]; and thus Richard (of St. Victor) says, that gratuitous love is, "that which only gives and accepts nothing",[4] and this is in the Person of the Father, for that reason it is appropriated to the Father. In another manner it can be said, that "charity" there is held *essentially*, just as (St.) Augustine says, that[5] to say "*of the Son of (His) charity*" is nothing other than (to say) "*of the Son of (His) Substance*"; but the genitive is not construed in the reckoning of a principle, but from [ex] the force of the declaration of an essence,[6] and (thus) the sense is: "*of the Son of (His) charity*", that is "of His dear Son"; and "*of the Son of (His) Substance* and/or Nature", this is (to say) "of (His) consubstantial and natural Son".

Dub. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius est de substantia Patris homoousion* quia — cum filius naturalis partem substantiae trahat a patre, partem a matre in his inferioribus, et in Deo totam substantiam trahat a Patre — videtur quod Pater non tantum deberet dici pater, sed etiam mater, et multo fortius mater, quia mater plus dat quam pater. *Item*, Filius Dei vocat se *sapientiam* et sapientiam, quae *concipitur* et *parturitur*, Proverbiorum octavo.[7] Ergo cum hoc proprium sit matris, videtur quod Pater proprius deberet dici mater quam pater.

Doubt X

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *the Son is from the Substance of the Father, homousion* because — since among these inferior (creatures), a natural son draws part of (his) substance from [a] (his) father, part from (his) mother, and in God draws (His) whole Substance from the Father — it seems that the Father ought not only be called "a father", but also "a mother", and much more strongly "a mother", because a mother gives more than a father. *Likewise*, the Son of God calls Himself "*Wisdom*", and a "Wisdom", which "*is conceived*" and "*given birth*" [parturitur], (as is written in) the eighth (chapter) of Proverbs.[7] Therefore since this is proper to a mother, it seems that the Father more properly ought to be called "a mother" than "a father".

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen matris non transfertur ad divina. Et unam rationem assignat Anselmus in Monologio:[8] quia principium maternum praeexigit aliud principium prius. Et ratio huius est, quia mater est principium passivum, et omne tale movetur ab alio: ergo ante ipsum est

I respond: It must be said, that the name of "mother" is not transferred to the divine. And (St.) Anselm assigns one reason (for this) in (his) Monologium:[8] because a maternal principle demands before it [praeexigit] an other prior principle. And the reason for this is, that a mother is a

principium aliud. Quoniam igitur principium generationis Filii est primum et est pure actuale, ideo nullo modo transfertur maternum principium; transfertur tamen actus maternus, ut concipere et parturire, pro eo quod *ibi* agit unum principium quod[9] *hic* duo.

passive principle, and every such (principle) is moved by an other: therefore before it there is an other principle. Therefore since the Principle of the generation of the Son is the First and is purely actual, for that reason in no manner is a maternal principle transferred (into the divine); however there is transferred the maternal act, such as "to conceive" and "to give birth", for the reason that *there* one Principle acts, whereas [quod][9] *here* two (do).

Dub. XI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Filius et Spiritus sanctus non est de nihilo.* Videtur enim falsum, quia illud quod de nulla praeiacente materia est, de nihilo est; sed Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt de aliquo, ut de Patre; quaeritur tunc, utrum Pater sit ex nihilo; et videtur quod sic, quia *non aliquid* et *nihil* convertuntur; sed Pater non est ex[10] aliquo: ergo est ex nihilo. *Item*, quia Pater non habet principium effectivum, ideo dicitur esse *a nullo*: ergo[11] cum non habeat materiam, debet dici *de nihilo*. Si conceditur de Patre; *contra*: omne quod habet esse de nihilo, est creatum:[12] ergo etc.

Doubt XI

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *the Son and the Holy Spirit is not from nothing*. For it seems (to be) false, because that which is from no prejacent [praeiacente] matter, is from [de] nothing; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are of this kind: ergo etc.. *If you say*, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from someone, as from the Father; then it is asked, whether the Father is out of nothing; and it seems that (He is) so, because *not anything* and *nothing* are convertible [convertuntur]; but the Father is not out of[10] something: therefore He is out of nothing. *Likewise*, because the Father does not have an effective principle, for that reason He is said to be *by none* [esse a nullo]: therefore[11] since He does not have a matter, He ought to be said (to be) *from nothing*. If (this) is conceded concerning the Father; *on the contrary*: everything which has (its) "to be" from nothing, has been created:[12] ergo etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid esse de nihilo, secundum Anselmum in Monologio[13] tripliciter potest intelligi. *Uno modo*, ut / nihil accipiatur simpliciter privative vel negative, . . .

I **respond**: It must be said, that when anything is said to be from nothing, according to (St.) Anselm in the Monologium[13] (this) can be understood in a threefold manner. In *one manner*, so that / "nothing" is accepted simply privatively and/or negatively, . . .

---

[1] Vat. clarius *cum*, cui lectioni obstant omnes codd. et ed. 1 ac forma indicativi in verbo *est*. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 verbo *invariabile* praefixum *est* expunximus, et fide antiquiorum mss. ac ed. 1 substituimus *invariabilitatem* pro *invarietatem*; lectio mss. certe praeferenda.

[2] Vat. adiungit *est*, sed contra antiquiores codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3. Codd. R X *additur*. Paulo infra post *id est* Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus codd., omittit *Filii*. Verba August., XV. de Trin. c. 19. n. 37. sunt: Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intelligitur, quam Filii sui

[1] The Vatican edition reads more clearly *since* [cum], which reading do all the codices and edition 1 withstand, as the form of the indicative (is employed) in the verb *is* [est]. A little below this, on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have expunged the *is* [est] prefixed to *invariable* [invariabile], and trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *invariability* [invariabilitatem] for *invariety* [invarietate]; the reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be prefered.

[2] The Vatican edition adjoins *there has* [est], but

dilecti.
[3] Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *quod propter* pro *Ad*.
[4] Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc post *caritas* omittit *est* ac din *et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus*; demum pro *nihil* ponit *non*. — Textum Richardi vide supra d. 2. q. 4.
[5] Vat. cum cod. cc *quia* pro *quod*, sed obstant antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.
[6] De significatione *genitivi* vide supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post *sensus* addit *et* ac post *vel* adiicit *etiam*, quae particulae absunt a vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1.
[7] Vers. 24. 25. — Paulo ante Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *sapientia est, quae* pro *sapientiam, quae*.
[8] Cap. 42: quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit: nimis est incongruum, ut illi parenti adaptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa aut sociatur aut praecedit. — De proxime sequenti ratione vide Aristot., I. de Generat. animal. c. 19. 20. et ibid. II. c. 4. — Nonnulli codd. post *principium* omittunt *prius*, et Vat. cum nonnullis mss. omittit *et*, quod fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 voci *ratio* praefiximus.
[9] Vat. cum cod. cc *et* loco *quod*, sed minus bene et contra antiquiores codd. Sub *ibi* intellige: in generatione Filii.
[10] Aliqui codd. ut aa bb dd ff cum ed. 1 hic et immediate post *de* loco *ex*.
[11] Vat. cum cod. cc *simili modo* pro *ergo*, quod tamen alii codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent.
[12] Ex. mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *creatam* loco *creatura*. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 adiungit tale argumentum *Item quod est ex nihilo, est vertibile in nihilum ergo* etc.
[13] Cap. 8.

contrary to the more ancient codices and editions 1, 2 and 3 [trans. note: which however the English syntax requires for clarity]. Codices R and X read *there is added* [additur]. A little below this after *that is* [id est] the Vatican edition, contradicting the older codices, omits *Son* [Filii]. The words of (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 19, n. 27, are: of "of the Son of His charity", nothing other is understood, than "of His beloved Son".
[3] The Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, has *that on account of* [quod propter] in place of *Regarding* [Ad].
[4] Thus the ancient codices together with edition 1, while the Vatican edition together with the more recent codex cc after *charity* [caritas] omits *is* [est] and then reads *and, as Richard (of St. Victor) says, because gratuitous love* [et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus]; finally it reads *and does not accept* [et non accipit]. — See the text of Richard above in d. 2, q. 4.
[5] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *that* [quia] instead of *that* [quod], but the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 are opposed.
[6] Concerning the signification of the *genitive*, see above d. 3, p. II. doubt 3. — Then the Vatican edition together with codex cc after *the sense is* [est sensus] adds *both* [et] and after *and/or* [vel] it inserts *even* [etiam], which particles are absent from the older manuscripts and edition 1.
[7] Verses 24-25. — A little before this the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *He is the Wisdom, which* [sapientia est, quae] in place of *a Wisdom, which* [sapientiam, quae].
[8] Chapter 42: Because the first and principle cause of an offspring is in the father. For if in any manner the paternal cause always precedes the maternal: it is exceedingly incongruous, that there be adapted to that parent the name of "mother", with which to beget an offspring no other cause either associates nor does it precede. — Concerning the next following reason see Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. I, chs. 19 & 20 and Bk. II, ch. 4. — Not a few codices after *an other* [aliud] omit *prior* [prius], and the the Vatican edition together with not a few manuscripts omits *And*, which we, trusting in many of the manuscripts and edition 1, have prefixed to the word *the reason* [ratio].
[9] The Vatican edition together with codex cc has *and* [et] in place of *whereas* [quod], but less well and contrary to the more ancient codices. For *there* understand: "in the generation of the Son".
[10] Some codices, such as aa bb dd and ff, together with edition 1, here and immediately afterward, read *from* [de] in place of *out of* [ex].
[11] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *in a similar manner* [simili modo] in place of *ergo* [therefore], which, however, the other codices together with edition 1 exhibit.
[12] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *has been created* [est creatum] for *is a creature* [est creatura]. The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 adjoins such an argument: *Likewise what is out of nothing, is vertible into nothing, ergo* etc. [Item quod

est ex nihilo, est vertibile in nihilum ergo etc.].
[13] Chapter 8.

p. 123

nihil accipiatur simpliciter privative vel negative, ut cum dicitur de tacente: iste loquitur de nihilo; *alio modo* positive, ut si ita dicatur vel[1] intelligatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, sicut cultellus de ferro; *tertio modo* partim positive, partim privative, ut si dicatur aliquid fieri ex[2] nihilo, quia post nihil est aliquid, sicut dicitur: de paupere fit dives.

“nothing” is accepted simply privatively and/or negatively, as when there is said of one being silent: “that one speaks of nothing”; in *another manner* positively, as if there be said and/or[1] understood that something is made out of nothing, as “a knife from (formless) iron”; in a *third manner* partly positively, partly privatively, as if it be said that anything is made out of[2] nothing, (so) that after nothing there is something, just as it is said: “from a poor man he became a rich man”.

Ratio autem huius multiplicitatis est haec. Nam primo distinguendum est, quod[3] negatio eius quod est *nihil*, potest sistere *intra*, vel ferri ad hoc verbum *fieri*. Si feratur ad verbum, tunc *fieri de nihilo* hoc est[4] *non fieri de aliquo*, sicut loqui de nihilo, id est de nulla re. Si autem non feratur ad verbum, tunc affirmatur *fieri*; et tunc duplex est, quia *de* potest intelligi *materialiter*; et tunc significatur, quod nihil sit materia alicuius, et habetur secundus sensus. *Item*, potest teneri *ordinaliter*, et tunc est[5] tertius sensus, sicut creatura dicitur fieri de nihilo.

Moreover the reason for this multiplicity is this. For first it must be distinguished, that[3] the negation of that which is “*nothing*”, can stand still *within* (this word), and/or be borne to this verb “*to be made*”. If it be borne to the verb, then “*to be made from nothing*” is this[4] “*not to be made from something*”, just as “to speak of nothing”, on that account is “(to speak) of no thing”. But if it be not borne to the verb, then “*to be made*” is affirmed; and then (the sense) is twofold, because “*from*” [de] can be understood *materially*; and then there is signified, that “the matter of something is nothing”, and (in this manner) is had the second sense. *Likewise*, it can be held *in an ordered manner*, and then there is[5] a third sense, just as a creature is said “to be made from nothing”.

Dicendum ergo, quod secundum primum sensum Deus potest dici de nihilo esse, sive Pater sive divina essentia; tamen hic modus non est usitatus. Quantum ad secundum modum, omnino nihil fit ex nihilo, quia nihil nullius est materia.[6] Quantum ad tertium modum, secundum quem loquitur Augustinus,[7] quod sola creatura fit de nihilo sive est de nihilo, quia *de* notat ibi ordinem, ut habeat esse post non esse, hoc quod est *de nihilo* privat materiam praeiacentem. Quamvis ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non habeant materiam praeiacentem, quia tamen non habent esse post non esse, ideo non dicuntur esse ex

Therefore it must be said, that according to the first sense God can be said “to be from nothing”, whether as the Father or as the Divine Essence; however this manner (of speaking) is not usual [usitatus]. As much as regards the second manner, entirely nothing is made out of nothing, because nothing is the matter of nothing.[6] As much as regards the third manner, according to which (manner) (St.) Augustine speaks,[7] because a creature alone is made from nothing or is from nothing, because there “*from*” [de] notes an order, so that it has a “to be” after a “not to be”, for this (reason) that which is “*from nothing*” lacks [privat] a

nihilo: et ideo non valet primum argumentum, quia procedit ab insufficienti.

prejacent matter. Therefore although the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have a prejacent matter, nevertheless [tamen] because they do not have a "to be" after a "not to be", for that reason they are not said "to be out of nothing": and for that reason the first argument is not valid, because it proceeds by an insufficient (reckoning).

Secundum vero et tertium argumentum, *de Patre* factum, procedit, secundum quod negatio eius quod est nihil, fertur extra ad verbum et facit orationem negativam — aliter enim non aequipollet *non esse*[8] *de aliquo* et *esse de nihilo* — et secundum hunc sensum, sicut conceditur, quod Pater a *nullo* sit, ita *de nihilo*. Tamen, sicut dictum est, sensus iste non est usitatus; communiter enim utimur hac locutione, secundum quod negatio *de nihilo* sistit intra, et hoc quod est *de* accipitur ibi *ordinaliter*.[9]

However the second and third argument, made *concerning the Father*, proceeds, according to which the negation of that which is nothing, is borne outside to the verb and makes a negative statement [orationem] — for otherwise "*not to be*[8] *from something*" does not even equal "*to be from nothing*" — and according to this sense, just as it is conceded, that "the Father be by *none*", thus (is He) "*from nothing*". However, just as has been said, that sense is not usual; for commonly we use this saying, according to which the negation "*from nothing*" stands still within (the verb), and that which is "*from*" is accepted there *ordinally*.[9]

---

[1] Vat. cum cod. cc *aut*, sed obstant anitquiores codd. cum ed. 1.
[2] Nonnulli codd. ut aa bb cum ed. 1 *de*.
[3] Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loc *quia*. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc *vel extra ad verbum ferri* pro *vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri*, sed contra ed. 1 et ceteros codd., qui in eo tantum dissident inter se, quod pro *ferri* alii ut C L S U V aa bb ponunt *foras*, alii vero ut A W *extra*, cod. O *foras ferri*, alii tandem ut G H I K R T X Z dd ee ff cum ed. 1 exhibent textum nostrum.
[4] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *hoc est* loco *est*, quod habet Vat.
[5] Vat., repugnantibus mss. et ed. 1, *habetur* pro *est*. Mox plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *sicut* pro *et sic* in Vat. posito.
[6] In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur haec verba *quia nihil nullius est materia*, quae tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habentur.
[7] Libr. II. contra Maximen. c. 14. n. 2. et II. Actis cum Felice Manichaeo, c. 18. et de Natura boni advers. Manich. c. 26.
[8] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit *esse* ante *non*, et paulo post contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 post *et* omittit *esse*. Mox post *ita* claritatis gratia addit sola Vat. *quod sit*.
[9] Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *ibi*. — Plura de hac re vide supra a. 1. q. 2. — Eandem doctrinam habet Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 4. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. q. 2; et S. I. q. 41. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. de Tar., hic a. 3. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic

[1] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *or* [aut], but the more ancient codices together with edition one oppose this.
[2] Not a few codices such as aa and bb together with edition 1 have *from* [de].
[3] From the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *that* [quod] in place of *that* [quia]. A little below this the Vatican edition together with codex cc has *and/or be borne outside to the verb* [vel extra ad verbum ferri] in place of *an/or be borne to this verb "to be made"* [vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri], but contrary to edition 1 and the rest of the codices, which only disagree among themselves in this, that in place of *be borne* [ferri] some, such as C L S U V aa and pp, put *outdoors* [foras], but others as A and W have *outside* [extra], codex O has *be borne outdoors* [foras ferri], finally others, such as G H I K R T X Z dd ee and ff, together with edition 1 exhibit our text.
[4] Very many codices together with edition 1 have *is this* [hoc est] in place of *is* [est], which the Vatican edition has.
[5] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has *there is had* [habetur] in place of *there is* [est]. Then very many codices together with edition 1 have *just as* [sicut] in place of the *and thus* [et sic] of the Vatican edition.
[6] In the Vatican edition and in codex cc there is wanting these words, *because nothing is the matter of nothing* [quia nihil nullius est materia], which are however had in the other manuscripts and edition 1.

q. 2. in fine.

[7] Against Maximinus, Bk. II, ch. 14, n. 2, and On Acts with Felix the Manichaean, Bk. II, ch. 18 and On the Nature of the Good against the Manicheans, ch. 26.
[8] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, transposes *to be* [esse] before *not* [non], and a little after this, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, after *even* [et] omits *to be*. Then after *thus* [ita], the Vatican edition alone adds, for the sake of clarity, *(also) that He be* [quod sit].
[9] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *there* [ibi]. — For more concerning this matter see above a. 1, q. 2. — The same doctrine has Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 4. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 2; and Summa., I, q. 41, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 10. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2, at the end.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.